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Introduction

Following the attacks on the twin towers, a new discourse surrounding Muslims took
precedence among politicians, academics, and media. The term ‘moderate’ became key in
identifying Muslims properly assimilated within Western culture. The moderate Muslim is
presented as a Muslim who moderately practices the faith, and believes in liberal and secular
values. The ‘moderate’ Muslim is good. They are Americanized, loyal, and tolerant. It is
assumed that exposure to European Enlightenment values create the moderate Muslim. If it were
not for exposure to secular liberalism, Muslims would remain intolerant and conservative like the
imagined Muslims back home in the East living under theocratic societies. Furthermore, the
moderate Muslim counters the extremist Muslim. The good moderate Muslim is positioned
against those Muslims whose Islamic values are incompatible with Western civilization: the bad
fundamentalist, jihadist, Islamist, extremist, and conservative Muslim. Essentially, the term
serves to provide an authoritative definition on what constitutes the “right Islam.” Moderation,
however, remains contested—after all, what is moderation? Who gets to decide?
My first chapter, “Perceptions of the ‘Immoderate’ Muslim,” focuses on negative images
associated with Muslims, and particularly Muslims abroad. The construction of the
‘immoderate,’ and ‘foreign’ Muslim ‘other,’ are the images we usually see on our TV screens,
the news, and Hollywood movies—images of burka-clad women, violent men, stoning, and other
brutal practices. Islam is depicted as essentially terroristic, oppressive, and intolerant. As of
recent, ISIS provides the latest composite image of Islam and its threat. Edward Said argues that
these constant images, and the language around it, are a facet of orientalism—the stereotyping
and ‘other-izing’ of non-Western societies as inherently inferior, backward, and barbaric.
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Orientalist depictions are not merely constructed stereotypes in the mind, but an entire system in
which these generalizations become marketed as “facts” and “knowledge.” The Orientalist—one
who studies the “other,” thinks that they know more about the culture, traditions, and morals of
these “inferior” societies more than these societies know about themselves. Furthermore, only
the Orientalist can be “objective.” Although Edward Said’s analysis predates 9/11, the attack on
the twin towers ushered a new wave of Islamo-racist orientalism, in which stereotypes of the past
have become reinforced in the present.
The chapter delves into the “objective” knowledge production that goes into creating
images of the ‘foreign’ Muslim through the use of polling and data; the perceptions people have
of Western Muslims versus non-Western Muslims in regard to ‘moderation’; misconceptions of
Shari’a and the history of Shari’a in the “Muslim world”; and how colonialism affected the
application of Shari’a in Muslim countries. I demonstrate that perceptions of the ‘immoderate’
Muslim are developed around the mainstream fear of Shari’a among Westerners. Positive
attitudes towards Shari’a among Muslims coupled with orientalist images of Muslims abroad
enforce representations of the ‘immoderate’ Muslim. However, the history of Shari’a throughout
the Muslim world, its intended meaning, and its recent developments reveal that Western
imperialist interventions in the “Muslim world” have led to the very negative orientalist images
of Muslims today. Moreover, Muslims living in the West have internalized these orientalist
portrayals of Muslims abroad, leading to a phenomenon of ‘Western Muslim exceptionalism’—
in which Muslims in the West believe that they contain a more ‘moderate’ understanding of
Islam. This leads to the pivotal question and central focus of my thesis on what it even means to
be a ‘moderate’ Muslim.
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Chapter two, “Debating the Moderate Muslim,” delves into the various understandings of
‘moderation’ provided between the secular West and influential practicing Muslims. The chapter
begins with Western philosophies and theories on secularism and modernization that influence
Western notions of the religion’s role in society, how it should be regulated, and how it may be
applied to Muslims. Moderation in Western society is a reflection of secular, modern, and liberal
beliefs and values. However, a closer study of secularism reveals that the shape secularism takes
is informed by social and political environments in which it is cultivated. There is an assumption,
that moderation can only be the result of a single process of secular modernization. However,
this “one shoe-size fits all” oversimplifies the critical nuances found in the history, culture, and
socio-economic-politics of each society, and assumes that there exists only one way for societies
to develop the “right” way. Even though this notion has been debunked by scholars, this attitude
still remains common among the Western consciousness. Therefore, the ‘moderate’ discourse in
Western Europe and the US centers on the ability of Muslims to secularize and liberalize
themselves. In this chapter I will demonstrate the different arguments put forth for ‘moderation,’
its reasoning, and its consequences.
Influential practicing Muslims, on the other hand, have a different understanding of
moderation. For most, ‘moderation’ entails a careful balance of faith between dogmatic
secularism and religious extremism. This does not suggest that being a devout follower of Islam
remains mutually exclusive from assimilating into Western society—rather the opposite.
‘Moderate’ Muslims, by the standard of devout Muslims, is the Western expression of Islam in
which Muslims can integrate Western values into Islam without compromising Islam’s integrity.
However, this chapter demonstrates that the seemingly compromising nature between Western
and Muslim interpretations of ‘moderation’ is not an accurate depiction of reality. Devout and
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integrated Western Muslims are still stigmatized and accused of potential extremism because of
their criticisms of Western foreign and domestic politics, despite their integration into Western
society. False pretenses suggest that ‘moderation’ is simply about the non-violent, tolerant, and
Western-integrated practice of faith. However, a deeper investigation into the ‘moderate’
discourse reveals that ‘moderation’ is a Western political construct to label Muslims loyal to
Western political interests while disparaging Muslims who criticize Western politics. This
requires an analysis into the active policies that allows this construction to take place.
The third chapter, “Making the ‘Moderate’ Muslim,” looks into the systematic
construction of ‘moderate’ Muslims through a combination of state policies, popular rhetoric,
and non-state activism rooted in Islamo-racism. Through a rhetoric of national security, state
policies have actively targeted Muslims who “look Muslim” and practice conservatively. Devout
Muslims, albeit positive contributors to society and well-integrated, are silenced from fear as
their very existence is viewed with suspicion. A well-regulated and well-funded network of
Islamo-racist organizations, think-tanks, politicians, activists, and token Muslim spokespeople
further maintain and legitimize the stigmas associated with practicing Muslims. The work these
groups engage in purposefully conflate mainstream Muslims with extremists, and emphasize the
importance of ‘moderate’ Muslim cooperation with the state to actively fight against “Islamic
radicalism.” Muslims who fail to show patriotic loyalty towards their American or European
homes are viewed as part of the problem, and any form of criticism of Western intervention in
the “Muslim world” by Muslims is an immediate red-flag on their ‘moderation.’
Through these chapters, I show that the ‘moderate’ Muslim rhetoric is problematic as it is
rooted in a particular political agenda. To describe Muslims as ‘moderate’ further aids in their
stigmatization, and takes away their political agency to criticize the West without an assault on
4

their religion or identity. Muslims who condemn policies of the U.S. and Western European
powers are easily labeled as Islamists—a disparaging term to describe followers of a political
Islam, in which their politics are influenced by their ‘backward’ religion. It remains
unacceptable for Muslims to hold political opinions critical of the state without being labeled
national security threats, unless Muslims are ‘moderate’ by Western standards. However, to be a
‘moderate’ Muslim is also being a political Muslim albeit, one that accepts Western political
interests, Western hegemony, and Western values of neo-liberal capitalism.

5

Chapter 1: Perceptions of the ‘Immoderate’ Foreign Muslim

In a world with a rapidly growing Muslim population predicted to surpass 2.8 billion by
the year 20501, how can we come to terms with the attitudes and perceptions of a vastly diverse
population of 1.6 billion current adherents of Islam spanning across all continents? As the West
enters a new phase of conflict with ideologies contrary to its own, it remains pertinent to
understand the role of Islam and Muslims in relation to modern day neo-liberalism, secularism
and extremism. American political scientist, Samuel Huntington, theorized that the next
progression of conflict following the Cold War will not be from economic or ideological
differences, but rather a clash of eight major civilizations vying for cultural and religious
supremacy over the world’s resources.2 Huntington believes that regions will rescind the process
of Westernization and fall back into their respective cultural identities, exacerbating a kind of
civilizational identity politics that will erupt at “fault lines.”3 Although Huntington’s argument
has been widely discredited and criticized for its simplicity and dismissal of complex
intersectional identities, the attitude towards Islam as a monolithic civilization that remains
inherently antithetical to the West, pervades the minds of many and has been politically
influential in the West. Many Western societies have adopted the belief that Islam in non-

1

Chappell, Bill. "World's Muslim Population Will Surpass Christians This Century, Pew Says." NPR, 2015.
Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs (1993), p. 22.
3
Ibid, p.29. Huntington argues that eight major civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, SlavicOrthodox, Latin American and possibly African, will become more culturally conscious with globalization and
greater interaction, pitting non-Western cultures against the West. Conflicts will become more regional as each
region will represent certain cultural and religious values. Fault lines refers to the points of demarcation separating
one civilizational culture from another. Lacking complete nuance, Huntington fails to expand on the complexities
behind culture, identity, and transmigration completely Orientalizing non-Western traditions. Furthermore, he
focuses more on cultural differences as a point of contention, while dismissing economic inequalities, aggressions
on state sovereignty, human rights abuses and neo-liberal imperialism.
2
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Westernized societies is a backward, intolerant and ‘immoderate’ ideology that threatens
modernity and human rights.
How Numbers Construct Images: Shari’a, Polling, and the Bad Foreign Muslims
In 2015, the Pew Research Center, a reputable research fact-tank based in Washington
D.C, published a report detailing various attitudes of Muslims around the world on multiple
issues, titled “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society.”4 The report gathered data
from participants from about 39 Muslim-majority countries (out of the estimated 50 Muslimmajority countries) from six different regions of the world (including Southeastern Europe,
Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Middle East-North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa),
not including the millions of Muslims living in non-Muslim majority states such as India, China,
France, the United Kingdom, Mexico or Latin America. The data reflects the opinions of
Muslims in favor and not in favor of Shari’a law on subjects ranging from homosexuality,
corporal punishment, women’s rights, religious freedom, and violence. As one of the more
popularly cited reports by various blogs, research and news media—the Pew Research Center’s
data manages to reinforce stereotypical images of a foreign Islam at odds with the modern world.
The report finds that a substantial number of Muslims remain deeply committed to their
faith, believe in the implementation of Shari’a in politics and society, believe that women are
obliged to always obey their husbands, and view certain behaviors such as homosexuality,
drinking, and prostitution as immoral. However, the report also indicates that certain patterns in
attitudes are based on regional differences. For example, more secular regions influenced by the
Communist USSR, such as Southeastern Europe and Central Asia, are more likely to hold

4

The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. The Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C, 2015.
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“moderate” attitudes regarding religion, than South Asia, the Middle East or Sub-Saharan Africa.
While the Pew data shows that those in favor of Shari’a law in all regions hold slightly more
conservative attitudes on certain issues, it also shows a diversity of opinions in how Shari’a is
understood and how it should be implemented.
A closer analysis and critique of this data, however, reveals that the Pew statistics do not
paint an accurate and holistic picture of Muslims’ relationship to Islam. A superficial reading of
this research can allow for politically motivated websites like Breitbart5 or The Religion of
Peace6 to further perpetrate negative perceptions of Muslims and Islam as dangerously
ideological and violent by cherry-picking generalized statistics that stand out, while ignoring
others. One example of a popularly cited statistic is when the Pew report asked participants in
favor of Shari’a how they want Shari’a implemented; the report framed this question to their
audience as: “What do Sharia Supporters Want?” According to the median percent of
respondents,7 a majority of South Asian (81% and 76% respectively) and Middle Eastern
respondents (57% and 56%) favored severe corporal punishment and the death penalty for
apostasy. The other regions (Southeast Asia, Central Asia and South-Eastern Europe) held much
lower median percentages. The median percent neither reflects the general attitudes of all people
in countries surveyed in the given region, nor does it reflect the circumstances of how
respondents believe Shari’a should be applied. Therefore, these numbers provide an insufficient
correlation between those who support Shari’a and supposed intolerant beliefs. Moreover, the

Hale, Virginia. “Survey Reveals Aggressive Pro-Shari’a Attitudes in Countries Providing Major Source of EU
Immigrants.” Breitbart, 2016.
6
"Muslim Opinion Polls." The Religion of Peace. Accessed February 05, 2017.
7
The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. “The median is the middle number in a list of numbers sorted
from highest to lowest. On many questions in this report, medians are reported for groups of countries to help
readers see regional patterns,” p. 23
5
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framing of this question suggests that Muslims who favor Shari’a only understand its
implementation as a system of penal code, further perpetuating misunderstandings of Shari’a.
On the outset, it seems as if these polls conducted by research fact-tanks, like the Pew
Center, allow for people to develop informed understandings of what Islam means to Muslims.
However, the contrary remains true. These numbers and data measure a superficial count of
opinions towards particularly designed questions originating from common negative tropes that
cater to a largely Western audience. They do not provide nuanced understandings of what
Shari’a is, what the socio-political climate of the country being surveyed is, what the historical
development of Islam in the region (culturally and politically) has been, what the education
levels of the respondents are, nor how specific interpretations of Islam have influenced the
country (i.e. state sponsored religion, independent religious institutions, or religious political
parties [Islamists]). The polling of Muslims seldom question Muslim attitudes towards
education, healthcare, welfare, warfare, nationalism, government corruption, their concept of
human rights, their community and family values, or how they perceive their contributive roles
to society.
Through data, think tanks, and preconceived notions rooted in orientalism,8 Muslims in
non-Western countries are perceived as a highly conservative and intolerant people with
immoderate attitudes towards liberal notions of human rights and Western concepts of secular
tolerance. Attitudes toward foreign Muslims are no longer formed through simple bias, but are

Edward Said deconstructed orientalism, an academic field studying the characteristics and cultures of “Eastern
civilizations,” as a problematic and inherently racist mode of study that otherizes, romanticizes and exoticizes
peoples that do not fit Western standards of what is considered normal. By producing scholarship and knowledge
about peoples from the “Orient,” the West imposes their own ideas and understandings of Oriental culture as “facts”
that ultimately dehumanize and inferior-ize peoples associated with Oriental culture because of their supposed
backwardness and barbarity. Orientalism has provided the basis for justifying colonization, imperialism and Western
foreign policy. Refer to: Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
8
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believed to be legitimized through measured numbers “proving” that Islam and the West are
ultimately incompatible. Orientalists, Western Conservatives, and dogmatic secularists such as
Bernard Lewis9, Daniel Pipes10 and Dr. Zuhdi Jasser11, feed off these very statistics that further
alienate Muslims globally from the West, to further certain political agendas.
Constructing the Good Muslim, Bad Muslim
Mahmood Mamdani, a distinguished political scientist at Columbia University, in his
work titled Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, focuses on the politically constructed narratives that
polarize Western Muslims from non-Western Muslims, indicating that the former is viewed more
positively than the latter. Mamdani argues that the good-Muslim, bad-Muslim discourse
originates from Bernard Lewis during his time as a policy advisor to the Bush administration.
Lewis believes that pitting Muslims against each other would solve the “crisis of Islam,"12 by
allowing westernized Muslims to fix the internal problems of ‘backward’ foreign Muslims,
rather than having the United States or Western governments overtly intervene in the affairs of
Islamic societies.
Premised from Said’s Orientalism, Mamdani describes Lewis’s discourse as a product of
“Culture Talk.” Culture Talk is a flawed understanding of culture in political and territorial

9

Bernard Lewis is a British-American academic of Oriental Studies that has authored of several books arguing that
Islam is a flawed ideology and incompatible with Western values. Some titles include: What Went Wrong? , The
Crisis of Islam, and Islam and the West.
10
Daniel Pipes, founder of the conservative think-tank the Middle East Forum, is an American commentator on the
Middle East and Islam. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), an advocacy center for
underrepresented groups, Pipes is a designated Islamophobe who actively speaks against Islam as a violent ideology.
11
Dr. Zuhdi Jasser, the founder of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD), is a politically conservative
Muslim advocate for secularism, and actively against any ideologies concerning politicized Islam.
12
Lewis argues that the main crisis with Islam is in their fundamental belief in submission to God’s will, preventing
their ability to progress and flourish in the modernized secular world. Their inherent mindset makes Muslims more
prone to government by dictatorship and tyranny because Muslims are naturally a submissive people. For him,
Islam is the reason for many of the ‘Muslim world’s’ problems. Refer to: Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam: Holy
War and Unholy Terror. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2004.
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terms, assuming that culture is an ideology when associated with a tangible place, despite the
fact that “it does not make sense to think of culture in political—and therefore, territorial terms.
States are territorial; culture is not.”13 Oftentimes, Conservative groups and fringe right-wing
Islamophobic organizations fixate on the idea of Islam as a foreign country and territorial enemy
of the West. In addition to the concept of a physical barrier between the two, there is also a
perceived moral barrier creating these “imagined communities.”14
Zareena Grewal defines this imagined community as “moral geographies [that] are
constituted by a set of ethical and political assertions about a piece of land that produce a shared,
conceptual map among the lands’ inhabitants.”15 The commonly used phrase, “the Muslimworld” encourages the idea that there exists an entire geographical region in contrast to Western
civilization, further perpetuating theories like that of Huntington’s. Mahmood asks, however,
whether “it makes sense to write political histories of Islam that read like histories of places like
the Middle East? Or to write political histories of states in the Middle East as if these were no
more than political histories of Islam there?”16 He proposes that “we need to think of culture in
terms that are both historical and non-territorial.”17 It would be a fool’s errand to assume that
Islam remains foreign to the West, erasing the hundreds of years of history of Islam in Europe,
and the history Western influence in Islamic regions.18 In other words, Islam and its cultural
influences must be understood with more flexibility taking into account elements of socio-

13

Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, 2004, p. 27.
See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (New
York: Verso, 1991).
15
Grewal, Zareena. Islam is a Foreign Country, 2014, p. 4.
16
Mamdani, p. 27.
17
Ibid.
18
See Maria Rosa Menocal, The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of
Tolerance in Medieval Spain (New York: Back Bay Books, 2012) and Hodgson, G.S. Marshall. The Venture of
Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974).
14
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political and historical developments, without reducing ‘Islamicate’19 societies as simple
byproducts of Islam as a rigid and spatially located ideology.
When discussing the current political state of affairs and the fringe Muslim extremist
groups carrying out violent attacks, politicians like Donald Trump, and media outlets like Fox
News, purposefully engage in rhetoric that specifically describe political violence as Islamic
terrorism. There is an implicit claim being made here; that violence committed by Muslims is
rooted in a theological violence influenced by an immoderate and backward foreign culture.
Consequently, these attitudes detrimentally affect significant segments of the population as they
translate into governmental policies. For instance, Trump’s executive order titled, “Protecting
the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” explicitly states its purpose in
protecting Americans from “would-be terrorists” that are “foreign nationals” from seven “high
risk” Muslim-majority countries.20 The executive order arguably remains a Muslim ban despite
encoded language stating otherwise. CBS News estimates that about half of the country (45%)21
supports Trump’s executive order, accepting the idea that Muslims abroad are bad Muslims
prone to violence.
Mamdani argues that the perception of Islamic violence as inherently distinct from
political violence exists because the West justifies and legitimizes its own political violence
because it serves as a prerequisite to progress as an end goal; and, therefore, “political violence
in modern society that does not fit the story of progress tends to get discussed in theological

19

A term invented by Marshall Hodgson so as not to conflate what is Islamic with what is Islamicate. Islamic refers
to that which is influenced by Islam’s religious principles. Islamicate refers to regions that are predominantly
Muslim or ruled by Muslims, but what occurs within them (i.e. innovations, arts, culture, laws) are not necessarily
influenced by Islamic religious principles.
20
"Full Executive Order Text: Trump’s Action Limiting Refugees into the U.S." New York Times. January 27,
2017.
21
“Americans Sharply Divide Along Partisan Lines Over Travel Ban, Trump: CBS News Poll.” CBS News.
February 03, 2017.
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terms.”22 Therefore, any violence committed by Muslims must be considered illegitimate.
Because Islam is perceived as backwards, any violence committed by Muslim groups by default
is understood as action stemming from a flawed theology, and not as having its roots in sociopolitical frustrations and marginalization. Thus, the foreign non-Western Muslim is perceived as
non-progressive, extreme, and prone to violence in contrast to the “good Muslim.” According to
neo-liberal Democrats and Republicans, from George W. Bush to Hillary Clinton, “good
Muslims” are Western, American, and remain actively engaged in the fight against terrorism. 23
They are loyal, patriotic, and “moderate.” How do we know this? After all, according to the Pew
Research Center, American Muslims are more likely to be tolerant, pluralistic and non-violent.24
Selective data and polling has effectively imprinted problematic and divisive attitudes
perpetuating tropes of the ‘moderate good Muslim’ against the ‘foreign bad Muslim.’
Western Muslim Exceptionalism: Moderate American Muslims vs. Muslims Abroad
“I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to the East and saw
Muslims, but not Islam,” said the greatly respected Egyptian Islamic jurist of the 19th century,
Muhammad Abdu, after returning from France in 1888.25 Referring to concepts of Western
freedoms and human rights, Abdu spoke to a feeling still shared by many 129 years later.
Negative stereotypes against Islam perpetrated by Western institutions make one wonder: what
do Westernized Muslims think of Muslims abroad? Do they think differently? Are they loyal to

22

Mamdani, p.47
See Beckwith, Ryan Teague. "Read Clinton's Speech Criticizing Trump's Muslim Ban." Time. June 14, 2016, and
Bush, George W. "Remarks at the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service." The American Presidency
Project. September 14, 2001.
24
See Lipka, Michael. "Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world." Pew Research Center.
July 22, 2016.
25
Hassan, Ahmed. "Democracy, Religion and Moral Values: A Road Map toward Political Transformation in
Egypt." Foreign Policy Journal, 2016.
23
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the United States or to “their Islam,”26 as Bernard Lewis would suggest? Muslims in the West,
specifically in the US, exemplify the bridge between Islamic and Western identities. Yet, the
question many grapple with is how “authentic” Western Muslims remain to each identity? To
attempt to answer this question would be to assume that Westernized Muslims share
homogenous opinions and socio-economic-political circumstances rendering their experiences all
the same, which is not the case. Furthermore, it would be a flawed endeavor to equate the
experiences of French, Russian, British, and American Muslims as one. It would be incorrect to
assume that all American Muslims, in their massive diversity, engage in static understandings of
Islam. Despite the vast assortment of Muslims, however, many American Muslims commonly
fall for the idea of a Western Muslim exceptionalism, believing that the Islam of Muslims abroad
is rife with backward cultural baggage.27
In a private survey of my own making, I polled a random anonymous group through
social media to fill out responses of their definition of “moderate Muslim.” I followed up with
more questions on why they chose their answers in detail, whether they thought American
Muslims were more “moderate” than non-Western Muslims, and what their personal
backgrounds were. Using SurveyMonkey, I generated this survey and collected responses over
the course of one week during the summer of 2015. The survey was made public on my social
media account, and shared with many acquaintances outside of my own friends and family circle.
Respondents were both American citizens and international, Muslim and non-Muslim. Out of
156 responses, I noticed a consistent pattern among many survey respondents regarding their
perceptions towards non-Western Muslims. Despite the small sample size, there were three
In reference to the notion of Islam as an “other” spatial location.
See Ewing, Katherine Pratt. Being and Belonging: Muslims in the United States since 9/11. New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 2008 and Corbett, Rosemary R. Making Moderate Islam: Sufism, Service, and the "Ground Zero
Mosque" Controversy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017).
26
27
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common themes: (1) non-Western Muslims are not exposed to pluralism as in the West, (2) nonWestern Muslims conflate conservative culture with religion, and (3) the lack of freedom among
non-Western cultures prevents a “moderately authentic” version of Islam. For example, the
following represent responses with similar sentiments echoed in many other responses:28
Respondent 61: “A moderate Muslim is one who authentically and fully practices Islam.”
“Non-western Muslims are very weird, they are not exposed to other ideas like other religions.”
Respondent 102: “A moderate Muslim is one who authentically and fully practices Islam.”
“They [Western] Muslims follow the religion with less of a cultural baggage than those back
home.”
Respondent 128: “A moderate Muslim is one who authentically and fully practices Islam.”
“Non-western cultures usually interfere with the religion, thus adding or taking away from the
religion until it isn’t what it’s supposed to be. In the West, you actually have to think about if you
want to follow or not due to the other paths that are available and it becomes genuine that way,
and more moderate as it is authentic.”

It is important to note that while some American Muslims feel as if they have exclusive
authority over an authentic and corrupt-free Islam, many American Muslim ideas regarding
“foreign Islam” result more from perceived environmental factors. For example, cultural
influences, lack of diversity, and lack of freedom are to blame, instead of Islam itself. Cultural
influence refers to the lack of liberal and secular values commonly associated with the West;
non-Western cultures are typically associated with conservatism and backwardness as Said
argues in Orientalism. The lack of diversity is mistakenly believed to be the perceived lack of
“religious” diversity in homogenous Muslim-majority regions, even though religious and
sectarian differences have existed in the entirety of history throughout Islamic civilizations.29
Perhaps it is the notion that Muslims in Muslim-majority societies see less of a need to engage
with other pluralistic faiths given their majority privilege in society. However, majority religious
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exclusivism exists as a global phenomenon, which includes the West. A significant portion of
American Christians are conservative and intolerant in their attitudes towards religious
minorities;30 therefore, this phenomenon is not merely a Muslim problem, but one of lack of
access to diversity. It is no surprise then, that many Muslim-majority African countries, have
greater percentages of interfaith interactions due to large integrated Christian populations in
those countries.31
Does the absence of freedoms in many non-Western, specifically Muslim-majority,
societies explain a Muslim problem? Many American Muslims lament the authoritarianism and
suppression of individual rights of their or their parents’ countries of origin. Is this a problem of
Islam’s influence in “regions” associated with it? Is this due to lack of westernization? And are
Orientalists like Lewis correct in their assessment of Islam’s predisposition to tyranny and
submissiveness? These narratives are often framed as the problem with societies influenced by
Islam in the Western consciousness. Answering each of these questions requires its own chapter,
let alone its own book, and I tackle some of these later. However, there does exist a general
frustration among westernized Muslims, that “foreign Islam” interferes with traditions of “nonWestern culture” as respondent 128 describes, thus allowing for the belief that Islam in the West
remains more “authentic” and “moderate,” reminiscent of the sentiments earlier mentioned of the
Islamic jurist, Muhammad Abdu.
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Although American Muslims have adopted this notion of Western Muslim
exceptionalism, American Muslims like many Orientalists, also implicitly subscribe to the idea
that “authentic” Islam is found in its birthplace—the “Orient.” As confusing as it may be, the
relationship between American Muslims and Islam reveals the paradoxical and complicated
nature of these two identities. On one hand, there exists the belief that Islamic wisdom is stored
in ancient archives in the Islamic “moral geography,” yet, on the other, the freedoms offered by
the United States and Western societies allow for an ideal environment for “authentic” Islamic
flourishing. Zareena Grewal inquires this dynamic in her book, Islam is a Foreign Country, as a
phenomenon experienced primarily by young American Muslims. She offers more nuanced ways
to think about questions that American Muslims grapple with: “What makes Islam belong to a
place? Can Islam be an American religion without being compromised, diluted, disfigured, and
assimilated?”32
Despite these conundrums, there is a general acceptance among American Muslims that
“Islam is something fundamentally distinct from any human culture. It has become a priority for
young Muslims to separate cultural baggage from the Islam they practice, whatever the source of
that baggage,”33 which remains prevalent for many diasporic and immigrant Muslims who can
only conceptualize Islam through the cultures of their native lands;34 thus, reinforcing tropes of
‘the other foreign Muslim’. Nonetheless, young Muslims also believe that “national and cultural
identities can complement and reinforce Islamic aspects of the self,”35 allowing for a Western
experience of Islam without Western values dictating Islam. But, Grewal’s research paints an
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alternate picture. There simultaneously exists a contradiction where young American, and
Western Muslims are traveling to the Middle East to learn Islam the “proper” way.
The quest for “authenticity” remains largely a question of “authority;” who has the
authority to define Islam?36 While Islam has always remained a non-hierarchical and egalitarian
religion, religious guidance from learned and pious scholars has always existed until the
breakdown of independent religious academic institutions. This vacuum leads to the insecurity
of many Western Muslims today, actively seeking an interpretation befitting to the needs of
modern Muslims in the Western world. On one hand, foreign Muslims are not ‘moderate’
enough, and on the other, Western Islam is missing legitimacy. This vacuum, consequently
opens up room for many contending interpretations within the West. This is the conundrum
plaguing Muslims living in the West. Desiring both moderation and authenticity, Western
Muslims have taken the burden upon themselves to reinterpret an authoritative understanding of
Islam as a result of their acceptance of Western exceptionalism.
“For many Muslim American student-travelers, their search for an authentic Islam in the
Middle East is a search for a way to be whole, to be an ‘authentic Muslim,’ by traveling ‘back’ in
space and time.”37 W.E.B DuBois referred to this dilemma as the “double-consciousness”—the
feeling of our identities as separate entities, rather than a unified one. Like a tourist bringing
back exotic souvenirs from abroad, going “back” to the lands of Eastern wisdom, and bringing
back “knowledge” to the modern Western world, is part of the process of authenticating Islam in
the West, so that it can serve as a global paragon for Muslims in the non-West, where their Islam
is corrupted by conservative cultural traditions.
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Classical Shari’a: A Flexible History
When Muslims are accused of backwardness for adhering to their ‘draconian’ ways of
Shari’a law, many Muslims will nostalgically think back to the Islamic Golden Age—a period of
civilizational advancement for Muslims under the Islamic caliphates, compared to their Christian
counterpart empires still stuck in the Dark Ages. A period of scientific achievement, rich
investments in the arts and architecture, and a thriving economy,38 the glorious Islamic past
provides both comfort and a defense for Western Muslims that the applicability of Shari’a law is
not an impediment to progress. But the images of Saudi Arabia’s beheadings, stoning, and
chopping off of the hands define Shari’a for many Westerners. It is viewed as merely a barbaric
penal code sanctioned by Islam against those who do not strictly follow its doctrines. These
images are constantly reinforced in our minds—from our younger days watching scenes of
chopping off hands in Aladdin, to now watching hit drama series of Middle Eastern terrorists in
shows like Tyrant, Homeland, and 24 and the constant terror-cycle of corporate news. So when
Muslims show their desire for a Shari’a-based system in foreign countries in polls and surveys,
the correlation between barbarity and foreignness becomes stronger. For most Muslims,
however, Shari’a is defined as “the path that leads one closest to God,” through one’s personal
and social conduct. How is it that historically Shari’a has coincided with Islamic progress, but is
now viewed as oppressive and regressive?
The concept of Shari’a, throughout Islamic Caliphate history, has always remained rather
intricate and flexible prior to the disastrous effects of Western colonialism leading to its current
rigid implementation. Contrary to popular perceptions, Shari’a has never been a single corpus of
See Marshall Hodgson’s, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization. (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1974) and Menocal, Maria Rosa. The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and
Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain. (New York: Back Bay Books, 2012).
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law strictly enforced by Islamic governments. Conceptually, Shari’a, is the “straight path” (sirat
al-mustakim)39 that leads one directly to God. In other words, Shari’a allows one to attain
paradise in the afterlife (akhira), based on the way he or she lives on the temporal earth (dunya).
However, Shari’a is not an explicitly written code of conduct; rather, it is implicitly derived from
the Qur’an, Hadiths (sayings of the Prophet and his Companions), and Sunna (the ways of the
Prophet). No individual can completely claim to comprehend or authoritatively declare what
Shari’a is. This is because Shari’a by its very essence is divine, and its intentions and secrets can
only be known by God; “Shari’a is the eternal, immutable, and unchanging law as it exists in
God’s mind. In essence, the Shari’a is the ideal law as it ought to be in the Divine realm, and as
such it is by definition unknown to human beings on this earth,”40 because human beings cannot
read God’s mind. Nonetheless, learned religious scholars can engage in a process of fiqh41-Islamic jurisprudence which attempts to understand Shari’a through a full mental immersion in
scripture—and, actively seek answers to questions related to worldly affairs. “As such, fiqh is not
itself Divine, because it is the product of human efforts…By definition, fiqh is human and
therefore subject to error, alterable, and contingent.”42
The development of Shari’a into Islamic jurisprudence occurred sometime after Prophet
Muhammad’s (pbuh)43 death. Jurisprudence as it existed in the classical age of Islam, is not how
it existed under the Prophet’s early community. Rather, Shari’a under the first community of
Muslims, existed in the form of pious and reputable leaders who made decisions that they felt
were most appropriate for the community, using the Qur’an and Hadith as their sources of

From the opening chapter in the Qur’an, Surah al-Fatiha.
El-Fadl, Khaled A. The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from Extremists, 2005, p. 150.
41
Means comprehension or knowledge through jurisprudence.
42
El-Fadl, p.150.
43
(Pbuh) stands for “peace be upon him.” Muslims use the abbreviated form out of respect.
39
40

20

inspiration. Based more on personal judgement than codified law, the Shari’a existed as a
discursive community engaged in debate over Islamic ethics for righteous behavior. Concepts of
consensus (ijma) and community well-being (maslaha) defined how Shari’a was to be
implemented.
In the classical age of Islam, Islamic Jurisprudence progressed as a result of writing down
different legal opinions, which later developed into scholarly religious institutions dedicated to
the religious sciences. Jurisprudence is the procedure of extracting laws and knowledge from
Islamic scripture. “In the first couple centuries of Islam, well over thirty schools of legal thought
existed, organized along lines of methodological and interpretative differences…all considered
equally legitimate and orthodox.”44 For example, the Muta’zilites, place emphasis on rationalism
and logic influenced by ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, when approaching
Shari’a.45 More “orthodox” schools, on the other hand, like the Shafi’i, Hanbali, and Maliki
schools, place greater emphasis on hadiths,46 yet, may differ on whether to read them literally or
metaphorically. The process of deriving Shar’i legal decisions for different circumstances
typically involves the following:47
1. God reveals the Qur’an and Sunnah (practice of Muhammad pbuh).
2. The ulama (learned religious scholars) engage in the practice of ijtihad (inquiry) to
derive meaning from hadiths and the Qur’an.
3. The ulama engage in fiqh (jurisprudence) and derive a ruling, taking maslaha
(community well-being) into account.
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4. A fatwa (non-legally binding advisory decision) is delivered by a learned mufti (a
local religious leader), which may or may not be taken into account by the respected
parties.
5. A qadi (court judge) issues a binding legal decision regarding matters in court.
Because so many different methodologies exist for deriving a religious ruling, Shari’a
remained relatively fluid in its application. Religious rulings ranged from family law to
economic transactions. One such example of a popularly examined subject in Islamic
Jurisprudential history involves the permissibility of birth control and contraception. Although
modern forms of contraception did not exist during the classical age, scholars from as early as
the 7th century have engaged in this debate. The discussion surrounding contraception, usually
took form regarding the permissibility of practicing coitus interruptus, also known as
withdrawal.
The 12th century Shafi’i jurist, Ghazali, ruled that no basis existed for prohibiting
contraception, and derived his opinion from a hadith in which the Prophet (pbuh) was known to
permit coitus interruptus because there is no stopping God’s will from putting life into the
womb.48 On the contrary, the Spaniard 10th/11th century jurist Hazm from the Zahiri School
ruled that withdrawal, and all forms of birth control is forbidden based on an unclear hadith in
which the Prophet may have referred to it as “hidden infanticide,” therefore, abrogating the
practice in its entirety.49 Another opinion from the Hanbali School, suggests that birth control is
acceptable or necessary in certain occasions based on the notion of a woman’s right to her own
body and her right to pleasure during sexual intercourse. Extracting their ruling from a hadith in
which “the Prophet (pbuh) forbade the practice of coitus interruptus with a free woman except
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with her permission,”50 Hanbalis argue that only women should be able to decide on the use of
contraception, as motherhood remains a woman’s right, and withdrawal disrupts a woman’s
pleasure during intercourse which can cause either harm or discomfort to them. Only one
example of many, the issue of contraception offers a number of opinions, all equally valid, none
absolutely enforced.
“In the classical age the state could not produce Shari’a law; only the jurists could do so.
Laws passed by the state were considered regulatory rules not included as part of Shari’a law.”51
The initial role of the Caliph was considered to be both a religious and political role; one who
took charge of administrative duties influenced by Islamic ethics following the death of the
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). For instance, collecting zakat (charity) and distributing them based
on Islamic principles of social welfare, leading communal prayer, or ruling on family matters.
However, political schisms ensuing from disagreements over who contained legitimacy as the
next Caliph, politicized the nature of the role, occasioning a diminished role as religious caliphs
over time. As a result, the primary responsibilities of the Caliph focused on carrying out
administrative functions, while separate religious courts maintained Shari’a in society.
Therefore, religious institutions existed outside of the state’s domain. Under the Umayyads and
subsequent caliphates, state-sanctioned religious institutions were heavily looked down upon by
religious scholars, who adamantly argued against the influence of secular state administrations in
religious affairs. Not only did the two remain separate, but religious and state institutions often
clashed with each other. Both commoners and the ulama (religious scholars) criticized the
political motives of states and religious leaders who catered to state-interests. For instance, state-
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sanctioned qadis (judges) were viewed as corrupt sell-outs opting for wealth and influence over
non-partisan piety.52 Arguably, fiqh remained a relatively democratic and vibrant discursive
practice that aimed to build an Islamic society inspired by Shari’a ethics, while maintaining a
degree of separation from the state.
Post-Colonial Shari’a: A Rigid Present
As evidently shown, the endeavor to actualize Shari’a under Islamic caliphates, existed
as an amenable system, separate from the state, and ‘progressive’53 in its implementation of
religious law. However, “this whole complex edifice that supplied religious authority in Islam
started to crumble with the entry of Western colonialism in the 18th century,”54 drastically
impacting much of the “Muslim world” today. Any understanding of Shari’a in the modern age,
instantly paints images of intolerant conservatism and burka-clad women, instilling a fear of
Shari’a and foreign Muslims among Westerners. This begs the question: why do modern
Muslim-majority countries implement such a different system of Shari’a compared to the past?
Abou El-Fadl and other Islamic scholars have demonstrated that the current nontraditional implementation of Shari’a results from Western colonial interventions in the political
and religious institutions of Muslims, which have compromised the role of “Shari’a in Muslim
society” as jurists eventually “lost their privileged position in society,”55 and European lawmakers promoted Western-style codes of law. The expansion of Western colonialism in the
Middle East and South Asia prompted incompatible changes to traditional styles of life that were
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developing differently from the West’s definition of “modern” and “enlightened.” The fall of the
Mughal dynasty and Ottoman Empire ushered a new era of Shari’a law—one which became
systematized, rigid and conservative.
Over time, European imperialists promoted Western Enlightenment values among
colonial subjects within the colonized Middle East, and produced an elite class of Westerneducated Arab professionals.56 Many of these new Muslim-Arab professionals influenced by
Western-style law schools, and ideologies of ethno-nationalisms founded much of the modernday politicized versions of Shari’a witnessed in many Muslim societies. As a matter of fact, most
modern Islamist movement leaders, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, or Hezbollah are
composed of Western-educated scientists and engineers with no formal training in classical
Islamic Jurisprudence.57 Yet, their desire for sovereignty from Western-controlled dictatorships,
and Western imperialism provoked new understandings of Islam from the lens of liberation
movements. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood, a political movement that attempts to
integrate elements of Western-style democracy with Shari’a-inspired principles, has long fought
against dictatorships in the Middle East, notably in Egypt under Hosni Mubarak’s presidency.
The systematic merging of Shari’a into the political ideologies of these groups is a relatively
new phenomenon, rooted in Western legal systems. Although most Westerners and Western
media portray these groups as “radical Islamists” who follow backward and politicized
interpretations of Islam, they are arguably byproducts of modernization, and anything-but
“backward,” as Shari’a existed as an entirely different concept historically.
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Most Islamist groups, however, operate outside of state structures either as political
parties or fringe political movements suppressed by the state. Therefore, their codification of
Shari’a enmeshed with their political ideologies represent a different circumstance from the
codification of Shari’a by states. Western colonialism of Muslim lands, political-economic
interests with conservative religious elites, orientalist beliefs about Muslim subjects, and
imposition of Western-style legal systems have all contributed to the current institutionalization
of state-sponsored Shari’a.
Saudi Arabian Shari’a: A Western Sponsored Wahhabism
Today, Shari’a is mistakenly equated with the laws found in countries like Saudi Arabia.
Infamously known for its suppression of women’s rights, corporal punishment, and hyperpatriarchy, Shari’a law by Saudi Arabian standards has an incredibly poor reputation with
Westerners. Inspired by the interpretation of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an 18th century
puritanical commentator, Saudi Arabian Shari’a promotes a strictly literalist interpretation of
Islam rejecting other ideas including “mysticism, the doctrine of intercession, rationalism, and
Shi’ism as well as many practices considered heretical innovations.”58 Despite the antithesis
between the Wahhabi creed and Western values, the establishment of Wahhabism in Saudi
Arabia, and negative understandings of Shari’a, are indirectly a result of British and American
interventions.
Abd al-Wahhab’s interpretation of Islam vehemently denounced the vibrant scholarly
institutions found in traditional59 Islamic jurisprudence. He argued that Islam has become corrupt
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because of the introduction of “too many” innovations, and he “often engaged in rhetorical
tirades against prominent medieval and contemporaneous jurists, whom he considered
heretical.”60 His teachings were based on a puritanical understanding of Islam which disallowed
“any rationalism or frivolity” and “emphasized that there was no middle of the road for a
Muslim;” a Muslim was not considered Muslim if they did not adhere to his standards of Islam. 61
His interpretation stated that any interaction with non-Muslims was considered heretical, and any
adoption of non-Muslim culture was idolatry.62 On one hand, Abd al-Wahhab deplored
nationalism; on the other, Abd al-Wahhab heavily drew from “the particulars of Bedouin culture
to be the one and only true Islam” and “obligatory upon all Muslims,”63 conflating Islamic
authenticity with Arab supremacy. Ironically, despite the Wahhabi denunciation of non-Muslim
allies, “Wahhabis were incited and supported by English colonialists to rebel against the
Ottomans,”64 to expedite the fall of the Muslim empire for European economic interests in the
Middle East. The British promised political sovereignty to Arab states after decades of Turkish
rule, appealing to their desires of pan-Arab unity and freedom.65 Ironically, Wahhabism currently
sustains itself through its dependent alliance with the West, despite its ideology denouncing
relations with non-Muslims.
The alliance between Western powers and the Saudi Arabian ruling elite has successfully
allowed for the institutionalization of Shari’a. The fall of the Ottoman Empire allowed the
British to establish colonial mandates in several Middle East states in the Gulf region and
institute political leaders of their own choice. One such individual, Ibn Saud, “was one of several
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local warlords competing to control the Arabian Peninsula.”66 Returning from exile “in the
British protectorate of Kuwait,”67 Saud formed an alliance with the “strongest military force
from the ikhwan, an egalitarian movement attempting to replace the increasingly threatened life
of Arabian tribal nomadism,” while also depended heavily on British funds.68 By no means was
Saud devout or pious, but many argue that he was an opportunist who wanted power. After
attaining influence and relative control over the region, Saud eventually let go of the ikhwan
alliance due to their conflicting motives with British interests; his contingency on British money
provided him with enough resources to violently crush an ikhwan rebellion, completely
dissolving them of their power.69
Westerners may mistakenly assume orientalist stereotypes that the strictly literal
interpretation of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia reflects a tribal nomadic setting, 70 as Timothy
Mitchell describes in “McJihad: Islam in the U.S Global Order.” On the contrary, “Wahhabi
ulama had always viewed the nomads as bearers of religious ignorance, jahiliyya (pre-Islamic
ignorance), and thus as raw material for conversion to Islam.”71 The Wahhabi ikhwan movement,
arguably, originated as a religio-political movement “of Arabia’s settled population against
Bedouin domination of trade routes and ‘protection taxes.’”72 Using religious language, these
movements attempted to enforce a rigid law on mobile Bedouin populations to preserve Arab
supremacy in the region. Saud’s alliance with the West, allowed these movements, and by
extension Wahhabi Islam, influence in spreading their religious ideology. British sponsorship of
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Ibn Saud, and Ibn Saud’s alliance with Wahhabi clerics to subdue nomadic groups has led to a
triangular power dynamic, in which Western money sustains Wahhabi influence in the region.
In addition to the British extending their colonial outreach in the Middle East for control
over economic resources, American oil companies also ventured into “the Orient.” As a matter of
fact, “in the same year that Ibn Saud defeated the Ikhwan, he began negotiations with the
Standard Oil Company of California (SoCal)” and switched “from British to American
protection.”73 However, the open-door relationship allowing Western imposition into Arab
affairs, elicited negative reactions from Saudi Arabians; “to win acceptance for this foreign
support, [Saud] made a compromise with the religious establishment. The Wahhabi leadership
would tolerate the role of the foreign oil company, and in return their program to convert Arabia
to the teachings and discipline of tawhid74 would be funded with the proceeds from the oil.”75
Thus laid the groundwork for American-Saudi relations. On one hand, the Saudi monarch
maintains its political power through its alliance with the West; on the other, the political
monarch gives exclusive domain to the Wahhabi clerical elite over all religious matters, stifling
dissent, and codifying a singular interpretation of Shari’a.
Although Western corporate politics indirectly promote this interpretation of Islam in
Saudi Arabia, tropes of intolerant and barbaric Islam often originate from Saudi Arabian
practices. The double standard of Western righteousness over its own record of democracy and
human rights, while condemning Islam for its supposed brute nature reveals the hypocrisy of
Western orientalism. By propping up undemocratically elected individuals and sponsoring oil
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monarchies who exploit religious-fanaticism as its clerical class, the West is complicit in
supporting the very “brute Islam” that it condemns. Islam in Saudi Arabia is not representative
of all Muslims. Nor is it representative of the desires of Saudi Arabian citizens themselves.
Rather, the interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia has resulted from political interferences, and
has managed to become the face of Islam globally. Moreover, Western interference in Muslim
affairs is not exclusive to Saudi Arabia. Multiple instances of this has occurred, and continue to
occur. South Asia represents an example of the direct interference of the West in the Islamic
affairs of the region.
South Asia: A British Legal System of Shari’a
According to the Pew Research Center, one of the more conservative regions with a high
median percentage of Muslims who favor severe corporal punishment for criminals, apostates
and immoral behaviors among Shari’a supporters, happens to be South Asia. A region long
known for its relative “third-worldism,” and slow social development, it may be no wonder to
most why conservative Islamic attitudes substantially influence the geography. What most may
not know, however, is that “in India, as elsewhere, it was the colonial administrators and scholars
who, driven by their stereotypes as well as by their needs, helped make Islam a rigid-law
centered entity in the lives and minds of colonized peoples.”76 British colonialism heavily
influenced how Shari’a was to be implemented on the Indian subcontinent.
The East Indian Company, a British occupying force of merchants and governors
interested in trading commodities and gaining access over Indian resources, played a direct role
in shaping religious law in South Asia. In an attempt to appear “helpful,” by taking the religion
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of the indigenous locals into consideration, British officers believed that they were most fit to
establish an ordered system based on Western models in India. British Orientalists believed that
their knowledge of indigenous populations superseded the knowledge indigenous people had
regarding their own customs. As a result, “the East India Company’s officers selected among
varied religious texts a set of norms and tried to apply them consistently”77 as a single code of
law. What the British failed to understand, was the complexity of South Asian religious laws and
values; what had been a long practice of engaging with religious laws in a flexible and
circumstantial manner, transformed over time into a more British style of enforcing a uniform set
of laws.
The Mughal Empire in India, prior to British colonization, had an intricate relationship
with Shari’a, which allowed for a much more liberal society compared to the current
conservatism witnessed today. “At the time of the Delhi sultanates, and then under the Mughals,
the application of Shari’a was an important form of legitimacy for the rulers, as well as a way of
justifying a social hierarchy at the top of which was the knowledge of adab—the rules of good
conduct.”78 These sultanates, “through a formal abidance to Islam,” respected the integrity of
Shari’a, by establishing separate and independent Islamic institutions that were administered by
the ulama and pious leaders, and did not themselves enforce “the details of Islamic law.”79
Enforcing religious laws and settling disputes occurred on a case-by-case basis, and many times
did not transpire in religious courts. Instead, many “disputes concerning members of a religious
community were often mediated by individuals belonging to other communities.”80 Shari’a was
implemented for “only particular serious breaches of public order or crimes involving prominent
77

Giunchi, p. 1119
Giunchi, p. 1121.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
78

31

persons who lived in urban areas,”81 and even then, each case was dealt with differently, taking
both majority and dissenting opinions of jurists into account.
British officers found local customs of executing religious law rather chaotic, indiscipline
and “arbitrary.” However, “the attitudes of the judges was not a result of their arbitrariness, or of
the arbitrariness of the rulers…but was in keeping with what was proposed by the jurists
themselves.”82 The nature or Islamic jurisprudence under Islamic rule has always remained
relatively adjustable because human beings are complex, and, therefore, Islamic law and Islamic
justice are too. Before British imposition, India adopted the Hanafi interpretation for Islamic law,
which originated in eighth-century Iraq by Abu Hanifah. It is known for its relative openmindedness and, “uses reason, logic, opinion (ray), analogy (qiyas), and preference (istihsan) in
the formulation of laws. Legal doctrines are relatively liberal, particularly with respect to
personal freedom and women's rights in contracting marriages.”83 Unlike the image of
conservative Muslim societies today, sex crimes and homosexuality in South Asia, were almost
impossible to convict, and many times overlooked if it did not meet the insurmountable
evidential requirements necessary for a verdict by Islam’s standards. Nevertheless, this all
changed with British interference.
Orientalist narratives informed European colonialists’ understandings of indigenous
people living in non-Western territory. This meant that “between the eighteenth and nineteenth
century, Europe produced an ahistorical vision of the Orient in which the peoples observed were
attributed immutable specificities, rather than defined as the product of historical
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circumstances.”84 Indian Muslims, and even Hindus, were viewed as an unruly group of people,
stuck in outdated ways. They were not viewed in terms of their complex social realities, or as
peoples who progressed too, albeit differently from Europeans. As a result, Islamic law was
viewed as a “fixed, timeless entity that in the course of time had been submerged by
traditions.”85 For this reason, British officers decided to take it upon themselves to “modernize”
the “oriental” people by introducing Western-styles of civil codes rooted in a uniform legal
system.
British law-makers mistakenly assumed that local indigenous populations were deeply
rooted in textual religion as sources of societal order. In an attempt to ‘modernize’ the Orient,
according to British standards, while also remaining true to indigenous customs, British
colonialists worked on reforming religious legislation to create a more standard and codified set
of rules.86 By forming relationships with religious elites, consulting “district and appeals courts
experts on sacred matters,” and gathering “norms contained in religious texts,”87 while
dismissing dissenting or contradictory opinions, British law-makers compiled standardized
versions of Islamic law, which have remained unprecedented under Islamic rule. They asked
maulvis, religious Muslim scholars, to provide single and concise answers regarding Islamic
practices, and overlooked “the many subtleties of fiqh (jurisprudence).”88 Other methods of
composing a rigid Shari’a law included translating “Oriental” texts into English, and writing
guides on how to execute Islamic law. For example, “in 1783, Charles Hamilton completed the
translation from Persian into English, which was published in 1791.” Shortly after, William
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Jones and Neil Baillie translated texts on Islamic inheritance law.89 William Hays Macnaghten’s
manual, Principles and Precedents of Muhammadan Law, “as well as those written later on by
prominent justices such as Ameer Ali, Abdur Rahman, and Tyanji, admitted that texts of Islamic
jurisprudence contained differing opinions, but tended in their expositions to gloss over areas of
contradiction, in order to simplify and systematize the discussion.”90
Not only did British law-makers emulate Western models of law when reforming
religious legislation in India, but also made sure that the laws themselves were “not to differ
excessively from the English law and values of the time.”91 This was most evident in the Britishinfluenced criminalization of homosexuality, and Western standards of dealing with sexual
misconducts like adultery. For instance, the “punishment of stoning for the crime of adultery
was banned, flogging restricted, and women were exempted from it; but, all those expedients
contained in fiqh…that made it practically impossible to convict someone of zina (adultery) were
not taken into consideration.”92 According to the Shari’a, four witnesses with honest reputations
are required to see the explicit sexual act take place in order for a guilty conviction. If any
witnesses are found to be lying, maliciously spreading fabrications, or uncertain of what they
claim, then the witnesses are to be punished. This often discourages individuals from accusing
others of crime, out of fear from lack of confidence and suspicion. However, with the
introduction of British legal standards, “the number of persons convicted of zina grew
drastically,”93 unlike the previous Islamic system which allowed for more leeway.
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Colonialism in South Asia shifted local customs and religious laws in ways that have not
existed in the region before. Shari’a, which was once flexible, became institutionalized and
consequently, marginalized dissent. Orientalism justified the “white man’s burden” to intervene
in the affairs of indigenous cultures, when no intervention was needed. By creating images of the
backward Indian Muslim, and imposing Western standards onto a non-Western culture, the
English managed to distort the spiritual and progressive essence of Shari’a into an unbending
legal system. Narrow-minded conservatism in South Asia today can, debatably, be attributed to
the long-term effects of European colonialism and Western hegemony.
Saudi Arabia and South Asia represent only two such examples of Western intervention
that led to the institutionalization of Shari’a. When going “back” to traditional engagements with
Shari’a under Islamic empires, it is evident that religious institutions were places of vibrant
debates and discussions that have shaped society’s relationship with Islam. Muslims flourished,
science progressed, education was encouraged, and knowledge was accessible. This is not to
paint a rosy picture of the history of Islamic caliphates, as internal problems have always existed.
Yet, it remains necessary to understand which phases of history affect which changes, rather than
understanding changes as natural occurrences of certain cultures. Learned scholars in Islamic
Jurisprudence did not necessarily disappear with the fall of the Ottoman and Mughal Empires,
and with the intrusions of Europe. However, the political marriages formed between religion and
state produced new variants of Shari’a that have privileged hegemonic and rigid interpretations
by elite classes assuming complete power and control (like Saudi Arabia). It is important to keep
historical contextualization in mind when referring to the relationship between Muslims and
Islam. What Shari’a means to Muslims, may not be what the West imagines as Shari’a.
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Conclusion
Western media, academia, and culture implicitly further the process of “otherization” of
non-westernized Muslims in ways that enforce the “good Muslim, bad Muslim” dichotomy. Bias
polling, and lack of clear definitions allow for a careful construction of the “foreign Muslim” in
ways that reinforce orientalist stereotypes of the “backward and barbaric Muslim,” which have
supported colonial administrations in lands where Muslims lived. The ‘bad Muslim’ supports
Shari’a law (as conjured through the experiences of colonialism), falls back on images that
Westerners mistakenly associate with “tradition,” is conservatively narrow-minded regarding
social issues, and relies too heavily on non-Western “cultural baggage”—all of which are the
makings of a potential violent extremist. On the other hand, “good” Muslims, are properly
westernized. They follow Western norms, believe in a notion of secularism that means
“moderate” and “modern.” ‘Good Muslims’ integrate within Western society and adopt Western
values into their religious beliefs, and therefore, exhibit more moderation. While these
generalizations are incredibly flawed, simplistic, and grounded in politics, they are also argued as
indisputable facts through numbers and polling today. Numbers and polling, however, only
reflect limited information that is not representative of an entire truth, and lack important
complexities. Society assumes that claims substantiated with mathematical evidence is sufficient
enough to be proven as facts; but even statistics and polling remain filled with bias. Composing
surveys and data require linguistic decisions, what people are popularly invested in, and
preconceived notions already in place regarding the given topic. In this case, surveys regarding
Muslims will focus in on their attitudes towards Shari’a, violence and women’s rights, because
these are popular perceptions already associated with Islam. As Edward Said said,
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There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, irradiated,
disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of taste
and value; it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as true, and from
traditions, perceptions, and judgments it forms, transmits, reproduces.94

However, orientalism is not merely a phenomenon exhibited by Western non-Muslims,
but Western Muslims too. Many Western Muslims believe that Muslims abroad represent an
‘immoderate’ and inauthentic Islam. Western Muslim Exceptionalism suggests that Islam in the
West is more ‘moderate’ and progressive because Western liberalism allows for an open-minded
space—one which provides room for an “authentic Islam” to flourish. This is especially critical,
as many Western Muslims grapple with a religious vacuum and express confusion with what an
“authentic Islam” could even look like. On one hand, many young, Western-Muslim millennials
believe that the “traditional’ Islam of their parents is narrow-minded and corrupt with nonmodern cultural influences. On the other, many young, Western-Muslim millennials are also
actively seeking out an “authentic” Islam, by traveling “back in time” to the Middle East as a
source of archival knowledge and divine wisdom, as evident in Zareena Grewal’s research. The
‘good’ Muslim and ‘bad’ Muslim polarization is perpetuated by both Muslims and non-Muslims,
due to the former’s desire to peacefully integrate in a society that often engages in Islamophobic
rhetoric. Fear of Islam, fear of Shari’a, and fear of devout Muslims shape the discourse
surrounding Muslims in the West.
Shari’a usually remains a point of reference when distinguishing which Muslims remain
a threat to the West—those who support “Islamic” law are conflated with backward terrorists
like ISIS or Al-Qaeda, and Western-born Muslims who join ISIS then reinforce conceptions of
“Islamic” violence. Shari’a is viewed as a totalitarian system that suppresses dissent and
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freedom, and encourages intolerance and violence; whether the misogynistic Middle-East, or
homophobic South Asia, Muslim-majority countries have a negative reputation with the West for
their religion-influenced political system. Yet, the West largely remains unaware that its own
foreign policies have shaped Shari’a in ways that have not existed under more progressive
Islamic states prior to colonialism. The modern-day perception of Shari’a in non-Western and
Muslim-majority countries affects the image of Muslims abroad in Western eyes.
Today, many Muslims, comedians, politicians, media, and lay people have adopted the
term “moderate” in their discourse as a way to distinguish which Muslims are socially acceptable
and which are not. By differentiating themselves from foreign and conservative Muslims,
‘moderate’ Muslims are able to prove their “goodness,” and trustworthiness to the West. The
term itself implies that moderating one’s Islam is the only way to safeguard against “Islamic”
extremism because Islam, by nature, must be inspiring intolerant dogmatism. If Muslims do not
identify themselves as ‘moderate,’ then there may be a chance that Muslims will fall back to
fundamental and literal teachings of the Qur’an, and potentially become future extremists—as
the Islamophobia discourse dictates. Although the term is thrown around loosely, this begs the
question: what does ‘moderate’ even mean?
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Chapter 2: Debating the ‘Moderate’ Muslim
There is a general belief in the Western mainstream that Islam in America is more
‘moderate’ than Islam in non-Western countries because American Muslims are better integrated
into a Western value system.95 There exists this assumption that growing westernization equates
to more ‘moderation.’ Rooted in European values from the Enlightenment era, many theorists
have argued that liberalism and secularism are necessary prerequisites for modernization, also
known as Modernization Theory. Simultaneously, there is an implicit association between
modernization and ‘moderation.’ According to dictionary definitions of the term, a “moderate”
is: calm and mild; opposing any extremes; and, associated with the middle-ground. Society
generally equates ‘backwardness’ and non-modern traditions with some form of extremism (i.e.
the way one dresses, prays, and chooses to eat a certain way). Therefore, a Western mindset will
agree that ‘moderate’ Muslims are Muslims who are modern by Western standards, meaning
Muslims who believe in integrating liberal and secular values96 into Islam. On the flipside, many
Muslims living in the West argue that Islam is, by its very nature, moderate. For Muslims, Islam
remains its own value system, contains its own conception of human and social rights, and does
not require Western values for its moderation, even though, the two are not necessarily mutually
exclusive either—essentially, moderation is a balance between narrow-minded conservativism,
and a complete free-reign liberalism. However, this all begs the question: Who gets to decide the
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parameters for what constitutes as ‘moderation?’ And why are there so many different
understandings of the term ‘moderate?’
Problematizing Modernization Theory as the Prerequisite for Moderation
Several problems exist with the notion that westernization equals a linear development
towards ‘moderation.’ This claim goes back to a common 20th century theory that posits that as
society progresses and secularizes, then society will also become more liberal, more “moderate,”
and less religious.97 Known as Modernization Theory, there are two assumptions that are
implied here: (1) that there is only one way to become “modern,” and (2) that moderation is
correlated to less religiosity. Because Western political philosophy was born out of European
Enlightenment reasoning, the foundational premise of these theories is rooted in the concept of
human reason’s transcendental nature. Governments, political systems, and morals are based on
the human ability to rationalize what is best for the human condition. Secularism and liberalism
are believed to be foundations for “modern” Western political societies as the former separates
church and state, and the latter proposes social equality, individual freedom, and inalienable
human rights. Modernization Theory does not necessarily argue that religion will vanish from the
human consciousness; but, it assumes that religion will have less effect in the public sphere, will
become more relegated to the private sphere as individual spirituality, and religious institutions
will lose power.
Despite the argument put forth by Modernization Theory, we see the exact opposite
taking root in American society. American society remains as religious as ever, despite being a
modern Western nation rooted in principles of secularism and liberalism. While it remains
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counterintuitive, Robert Heffner, an anthropologist of religion, argues that secularism in America
manifested differently from how older theorists perceived secularism would play out. Rather
than making American society less religious, secularism has allowed for American society to be
more religiously diverse rather than being dominated by one religious institution. This means
that American society allows for greater religious expression among multiple faith groups,
instead of enforcing a singular religious expression, due to its separation of church and state.98
As a result, religiosity in the United States has remained relatively steady, or increased even
more among already-religious individuals. In contrast, many European societies have seen
drastic decreases in religiosity and affiliations with religious institutions as European society
becomes more secular. Does this mean that the US is less ‘moderate’ than other Western
societies?
José Casanova, a sociologist of religion in Georgetown University, aptly deconstructs
Modernization Theory for its inadequacy. He argues for a rethinking of secularization, as having
multiple meanings, manifestations, and purposes depending on the historical, political, social and
cultural developments of societies.99 Western European countries and the United States have
very different foundational histories that have shaped the developments of their respective
modernizations. In European history, “there was a collision between religion and the
differentiated secular spheres—that is, between Catholic Christianity and modern science,
modern capitalism, and the modern state.”100 Furthermore, the marriage of religious institutions
with the state led to violent religious outbursts between conflicting Christian sects in Europe. As
a result, “modern secularism emerged in the seventeenth century as a political solution intended
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to end the European Wars of Religion by establishing a lowest common denominator among the
doctrines of conflicting Christian sects and by defining a political ethic altogether independent of
religious doctrines.”101 Enlightenment thinkers, scholars, activists and academics viewed
organized religion as an impediment to social progress, as the Church enforced religious laws too
rigidly and divisively. Enlightenment philosophy relied heavily on human rationalism as the
answer to all problems. Additionally, human rationalism could provide answers to scientific
inquiries with evidence, when institutional religion could not. As a result, the “secularist
genealogy of modernity was constructed as a triumphant emancipation of reason, freedom, and
worldly pursuits from the constraints of religion; and practically every ‘progressive’ European
social movement…was informed by secularism.”102 The direct clash of religious and secular
spheres have created a kind of ‘religious disenchantment’ in European society. Modernization
Theory, therefore, makes sense when applied to this particular case. American society, on the
other hand, experiences modernization differently.
“In the Anglo-Protestant cultural area…and particularly in the United States, there was
“collusion” between religion and the secular differentiated spheres.”103 Due to the American
separation of Church and State, and the lack of religious institutional hierarchy in AngloProtestantism, “there is little historical evidence of any tension between American Protestantism
and capitalism and very little manifest tension between science and religion in the U.S. prior to
the Darwinian crisis at the end of the nineteenth century.”104 Because the state cannot advocate
for a particular religious dogma, Enlightenment values of human reason and freedom find a place
in American society. The Constitution, supposedly, serves to protect the free exercise of religion
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from state interference, therefore, creating a strong foundation for non-state sponsored religious
activity. Unlike Europe, religious and secular spheres do not have a similar history of clashing.
As a matter of fact, both spheres have been able to flourish. Religious groups generally have had
ample opportunities to practice as they want, with state protection, and without state favoritism,
(with a few exceptions).105 The freedom to practice religion in American society, therefore, has
led to either an increase or relative stability, in religious expressions. Albeit secular,
Modernization Theory falls short in its application to American society, and even European
society as religion still exists there.
The discussion on modernization, however, remains important for our purposes because
despite being a problematic theory, “it is the tendency to link processes of secularization to
processes of modernization.”106 Many case studies prove Modernization theory to be overly
simplistic. For instance, “there can be modern societies like the US, which are secular while
deeply religious, and there can be pre-modern societies like China107, which from our Eurocentric religious perspectives look deeply secular and irreligious.”108 To further complicate
things, Pakistan and Indonesia can be considered modern and religious, yet not secular. Until
now, we see an inconsistency in theoretical terms that result more from pre-conceived notions,
than from actual reality. Just as different Western countries do not develop in the same linear
progression, the same cannot be expected of non-Western societies. Secularization cannot be
thought of as the precursor to modernization, as different societies and different traditions will
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“modernize” on their own terms. Moreover, this introduces questions of what it even means to
be modern. It is evident that ideas surrounding modernization and secularism remain faulty.
Despite all this, one of the main criticisms Orientalists hold towards Islam is that
Muslims do not secularize, resulting in their backwardness. Heffner calls this understanding of
‘Muslim exceptionalism’ the idea that Muslims fail at modernizing because “Muslims have been
able to invoke their great tradition of religious scholar jurists (ulama) and law (shari’a) as
symbols of nationhood.”109 In other words, Muslims who hold on to their own traditions too
strongly, and too patriotically, are unable to ‘modernize,’ progress, or be considered moderate.
But as already pointed out, it would be a false endeavor to correlate secularism with
modernization, and modernization with moderation, as each of these ideas are not inextricably
bound to each other through limited relationships. Nonetheless, there remains a Western
investment in the discourse on Muslim backwardness.110 Since principles associated with
modernity are marketed as universal values with foundations rooted in human rationalism,
secular-liberalist ideologies have dominated the global discourse as the supposed “right”
standard for laws and characteristics of all cultural societies. In fact, Saba Mahmood, a
distinguished social-cultural anthropologist, argues that secular neo-liberalism has become the
driving force to impose a Western-hegemonic will on to various cultural and ethnic communities,
ironically, to the point of taking away religious freedoms and committing human rights
abuses.111
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Secular Moderation: A Western Political Construct
Secular modernization is not a prerequisite for ‘moderation.’ However, if secularism
offers a kind of universalism, in which political institutions remain separate from religious ones,
would it be correct to assert that secularism is an essential component for Muslim ‘moderation?’
After all, Muslim extremists believe in integrating conservative and intolerant interpretations of
Islam exercised through the political state. Many Westerners believe that secularism serves as the
antidote to extremism, as it once helped end religious violence in Europe. But does secularism
actually lead to the tolerance it claims, or is it an ideological dogma itself? While secularism has
allowed for Western societies to solve problems unique to its own, Western societies now
employ an ideological secularism on other cultures to further its own neoliberal-capitalist and
political motives. ‘Moderate’ Islam exists as a discourse because Western states have
geopolitical investments in the ‘Muslim’ world. Therefore, it is necessary to deconstruct notions
and motives of the ‘secular,’ and put aside assumptions of its harmlessness.
Secularism advocates for a separation between religious and political rules, freedom from
religious rule, and a political rule inspired by humanist ethics. Developed by Roman, Greek, and
European philosophers, secularism venerates unrestricted-thinking, and individualism free from
institutional rigidity. Secularism contains multiple manifestations, and looks different in different
places. For instance, secularism in France advocates for the complete disappearance of any
religious symbols in the public sphere, while secularism in the United States protects religious
pluralism in the public sphere. Despite the various secular expressions found in Western polities,
it is important to question the nature of this philosophy and whether it holds true to the values it
proposes. Does secularism truly guarantee individual liberty? Saba Mahmood argues that
“secularism” as we conceptually idealize it, does not actually exist. In other words, Western
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secular dogmatism, while espousing individual liberty, imposes its own ethics and principles as
universal norms, to the point of taking cultural agency away from other groups. Western
societies utilize secular policies to implicitly regulate religion and the degree to which they are
publicly practiced, despite the belief that secularism entails a governmental separation of church
and state.112 Whereas religious institutions once dictated state affairs, the opposite now holds true
as secular states influence religious institutions. Ultimately, “secularity entails a judgement
about, and appreciation for, what religion should be in the modern world.”113 Historically, this is
evident in the “Jewish Question” that flustered Europe leading to state interventions in reforming
Jewish communities to be more secularly assimilated.114 Currently, we witness this phenomenon
as the state and media propagate discourses about ‘moderate’ Muslims.
Constructing notions of the ‘moderate’ Muslim, has turned into an effective political tool
for the state to create loyal citizens. Because Islam is seen under the scope of US national
security, “the United States has embarked upon an ambitious theological campaign aimed at
shaping the sensibilities of ordinary Muslims whom the State Department deems to be too
dangerously inclined toward fundamentalist interpretations of Islam.”115 ‘Fundamentalist’
interpretations could be understood by the State Department as any form of politics or beliefs in
opposition to Western values of secularism, liberalism, capitalism and foreign policy. Muslims
who criticize Western hegemonic policies, both in domestic and international spheres, are often
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labeled with a proclivity towards extremism. However, “in this elaborate undertaking, the U.S.
government has found an indigenous ally in the form of moderate or liberal Muslims who, in the
opinion of State Department planners, are most open to a ‘Western vision of civilization,
political order, and society.’”116 ‘Moderate’ Muslims are patriotic and loyal. They balance
extremism and carry more authority than non-Muslims. They are the pioneers of a ‘modern
Islam.’ Therefore, it is important for the United States and other Western governments to sponsor
‘moderate’ Muslims as exceptional contributors in the fight against terrorism.
The RAND Corporation, a policy think-tank offering research and advisory decisions to
the United States Armed Forces financed by the US Government and various private-sectors,117
often publishes reports on the need to encourage ‘moderate’ interpretations of Islam rooted in
democratic and secular values. A 2003 report published by RAND titled, Civil Democratic
Islam, warns the government about more ‘traditional’ Muslims.118 “According to the report, the
traditionalists believe that the Quran is the actual word of god, and their ‘goal is to preserve
orthodox norms and values and conservative behavior.’ They do so by observing Islamic rituals
closely …and consulting the Quran, the Prophetic tradition (hadith), and the Islamic juristic
scholarship to seek guidance on matters of daily conduct.”119 Their inability to accept Islam as
simply a historical event, and succumb to human reason over Qur’anic mandates makes more
traditional Muslims potential threats to national security as they will favor Islam over Western
interests. While most of the world’s Muslim population remains traditional and non-violent,
they are still deemed as potential long-term threats to secularism.

116

Ibid.
“About RAND: History.” Rand Corporation.
118
Benard, Cheryl. Civil and Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, Strategies, 2003.
119
Mahmood, p. 323-333.
117

47

While the report, “is forced to acknowledge …that in regard to sociopolitical issues the
traditionalists ‘do not usually favor violence and terrorism,’ represent an ‘essentially moderate
position,’ … ‘proactively seek interfaith dialogue,’ and even espouse ‘a relatively progressive
stance on many social issues,’”120 it still vilifies Muslims for their “incompatibility with Western
Enlightenment values.”121 Moreover, the tendency of Muslims to share similar criticisms of
Western foreign policy with that of extremists, leads the report to implicitly conclude that
Muslims as a whole are prone to extremism as well. As a matter of fact, the report states that
traditional Muslims are more dangerous than extremists—a claim made with no sufficient
evidence. Whereas, the latter is an obvious short-term enemy, the former is a more disguised
threat to Western values because “modern democracy rests on the values of the Enlightenment
[and] traditionalism opposes these values. . . . Traditionalism is antithetical to the basic
requirements of a modern democratic mind-set: critical thinking, creative problem solving,
individual liberty, secularism.”122
RAND also offers a solution to the problem it identifies— ‘moderate’ Muslims. In 2007,
the think-tank published a report titled Building Moderate Muslim Networks, which defined
‘moderate’ Muslims, detailed methodologies for building alliances with them, and discussed the
importance of the roles they play. According to this report, “‘moderate Muslims’ believe in
democracy, secularism, freedom, gender equality, an almost complete jettison of the Shariah
and, most of all, a rejection of all ‘illegitimate violence.’”123 The report suggests that ‘moderate’
Muslims are depoliticized in their attitudes, and accept the foreign policies of the US, Israel and
its allies without question. It is evident from this report that ‘moderation’ should be used as a tool
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to construct a certain kind of Muslim through state interference. Governments need to seek out
certain ‘types’ of Muslims who can easily be molded into patriotic agents. Cultivating
‘moderate’ Muslims require targeting certain “classes or schools of thought” usually from the
following: secularists, liberals, “moderate traditionalist ulama. Sufis…young religious scholars,
community activists and moderate journalists.”124
Western discourse assumes that secularization will allow for the de-politicization of
Islam and prevent extremism. Secularizing Islam will allow it to be a religion and not the
political ideology many believe it to be. The irony, however, exists in that Western secularism is
used, not to depoliticize, but to re-politicize Muslims into citizens that share the same political
interests in maintaining Western exceptionalism within the global power structure. Although it
may be assumed that less religiosity correlates to more moderation, the intent behind the
moderate discourse has little to do with religiosity, and more to do with the politics of Western
policies. “For example, a devout Muslim, fervent in observance of all personal rituals but not
participating in political affairs, would be a ‘moderate,’ whereas a marginally practicing Muslim
with the zeal to voice opposition to the injustice perpetrated by [American] extremists,’ America
would be classified as a ‘radical.’”125 The West may speak of human rights, individual freedom,
and progressivism as core Western values which need to be universalized by all cultures,
including Muslims. However, the discourse that aims to demonize Islam for backwardness,
inherent extremism, lack of democracy and enlightenment, only serves to advance Western neoliberal hegemony, in which the United States and its allies seek to maintain its power in
influencing world affairs. ‘Moderate’ as defined by Western institutions allows for a popularized
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public discourse that actively divides Muslims internally, ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ in order to justify
Western foreign policies in the so-called “Muslim World.”

‘Moderate’ as Defined by Muslims: An Internalization of Western Discourse
While neoliberal political interests have constructed the notion of ‘moderate’ Islam, many
Muslims also engage in the effort to reclaim and redefine the concept of ‘moderation.’ While the
majority of Muslims in the world identify with a more traditional Islam rooted in the Qur’an and
Sunnah, many Western Muslims have undertaken the ‘moderate’ Islam discourse when speaking
of the traditions of ‘some’ Muslims. Albeit defined differently from the West’s, the moderate
discourse used among Muslims speaks to the power of authority exuded in this term. To be able
to definitively establish a legitimate definition of ‘moderation,’ is defining power, authority, and
authenticity over Islam.
It is important to acknowledge that the ‘moderate’ discourse, even among Muslims,
varies widely whether along sectarian lines, on “religious and political terms… [and] from
conservatives to liberal reformers.”126 However, traditionally religious Muslims integrated in the
West generally contain similar understandings of moderation among each other. The highly
respected Islamic scholar from Mauritania, Shaykh127 Abdullah bin Bayyah, (well-known for his
mentorship of America’s most famous Shaykh, Hamza Yusuf), described the very essence of
Islam as a “deen of moderation.”128 Deen roughly translates to religion from Arabic, but more so,
it refers to a spiritually holistic way of living. He attributes this understanding of Islam to
hadiths spoken by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) himself: “The Messenger of Allah (saw) said,
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‘Those people who go into matters too deeply will be destroyed’… ‘Those people’ are people
involved in ‘tatarruf’ or extremism.” Additionally, the Prophet “warned against extremism” as it
causes one to lose their sense of balance and rationale.129 Theologically speaking, moderation is
understood as a natural quality of Islam, providing balance from the extremes of a heedless
secularity, and over-zealous and violent religiosity.
Moderation is consistently used to describe attributes of Islam’s traditional history, its
tolerance of difference, and promotion of peace. For traditional Muslims, it is repetitive to
juxtapose ‘moderate’ and ‘Islam.’ It makes little sense to treat the former as a qualifying
adjective to the latter, since moderation is already viewed as a foundational quality of Islam.
Furthermore, traditional Muslims would argue that ‘radical’ Islam does not exist, but extremist
interpretations may. Does this also suggest that a ‘moderate’ interpretation of Islam indicates
lighter engagement with it? How do traditional Muslims understand their moderation?

Khaled Abou El-Fadl: Traditional Islamic Jurist and Academic
The Qatari-born-American-Muslim academic at UCLA, Khaled Abou El-Fadl, dedicates
an entire book dissecting the differences between ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ understandings of
Islam. In his well-known work, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from Extremists, El-Fadl offers
his own clear definition of each group. El-Fadl, widely known for his work on Islamic law,
identifies with traditional methods of engagement with Islam rooted in Islamic jurisprudence. He
strongly rejects Wahhabi strains of Islam, denouncing it for ‘puritan’ tendencies, and advocates
for more open-minded approaches to Islam through the perspective of morals, values, and human
rights.
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El-Fadl argues that a natural divide or “schism” between ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’
Muslims already exists, in which the former makes up the “silent majority”130 of the global
Muslim population. The differences between these two, lie not in their political loyalty or
criticism towards the West, but in the extent of their flexibility or rigidity in their worldviews
and the degree of literalism in their understanding of Islam. He describes this as more of a range
than simply polarized categorizations. It is not necessarily that Muslims are either “moderate” or
“extremist,” but more so, that Muslims fall somewhere in the middle of a spectrum between two
extremes, “with the majority leaning towards moderation.”131 El-Fadl deliberately chooses to
leave secularists, Sufis, and sectarian differences out of his proposed definition, and focuses on
what he believes to be the defining difference of most Muslims—their methodological
engagement with foundational sources.
El-Fadl carefully chooses the terms to represent his definition of Muslim differences—for
him, moderate and puritan allow for more authenticity in what he wishes to describe. He
clarifies that moderate encompasses many groups—the “modernists, progressives, and
reformers,” orthodox Muslims, and traditional Muslims. ‘Moderate’ serves as an umbrella term
for a variety of religiosities among Muslims, as long as their worldviews are grounded in a
certain level of open-mindedness, flexibility and pluralism. On the other hand, ‘puritan’
accurately describes the opposite camp from ‘moderates,’ in that “the distinguishing
characteristic of this group is the absolutist and uncompromising nature of its beliefs.”132
‘Extremist’ implies the use of ideological violence as a methodology of interaction, whereas
‘puritan’ serves as the overarching term for anyone who remains “intolerant of competing points
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of view and considers pluralist realities to be a form of contamination of the unadulterated
truth.”133 Puritans comprise of, what is commonly known as, “fundamentalists, militants,
extremists, radicals, fanatics, jihadists, and even simply Islamists,”134 according to him.
However, he also problematizes equating ‘fundamentalism’ with ‘extremism,’ as many Muslims
would argue that that moderate attitudes are fundamentals of Islam.
El-Fadl subsequently breaks down the key differences between ‘moderate’ and ‘puritan’
Muslims in their different perspectives toward the purpose of religion, the nature of law and
morality, approaches to history and modernity, democracy and human rights, interacting with
non-Muslims, salvation, violence and women’s rights. Although Muslims have a vast diversity
of opinions on each of these issues, the main distinction categorizing Muslims as either relatively
moderate or puritan, stems from their willingness to debate, accept multiple opinions, and use
reason and individual agency; “Moderates believe that God entrusted humans with the power of
reason and the ability to ascertain between right and wrong,”135 while referring to the guidelines
of the Shari’a, understood through the discursive process of fiqh.136 “Puritans, on the other hand,
do not believe that the trust placed in human beings was so vast and indistinct. God gave human
beings the law, which in most instances is specific and detailed, and trusted them to enforce
it.”137 For puritans, there exists little discourse and reasoning when engaging with the Shari’a, as
it is viewed as a precise code of living not up for deeper philosophical engagement.
Moreover, El-Fadl insists that not only are these fundamental differences between
Muslims, but that Muslims are also reluctant to “recognize the existence of the schism within the
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faith.”138 He attributes this “reluctance” to the “powerful influence of the dogma of unity in
modern Islamic thought,” which demands that “Muslims should regard themselves as a single
person.”139 El-Fadl identifies this as a problem, as moderate Muslims should be able to separate
themselves from puritans who impose an unyielding and hegemonic worldview of Islam, which
ends up disrupting the peace of diversity. Although El-Fadl takes a more divisive approach when
addressing problems internal to the Muslim community, he has also criticized Western policies
and dogmatic secularism. In fact, he, himself, has been accused of being a “stealth Islamist” and
closet “militant,” for his political views.
El-Fadl’s engagement with, and definition of, moderate Muslims, arguably results from
the discourse already perpetrated by Western media. He attempts to detail what entails
‘moderation’ through a deeply theological lens, and refrains from describing political attitudes
that may be held by these groups. Instead, he subtly points out the hypocrisy of puritan groups
for their relatively cozy relationship with Western interests (for example, Saudi Arabia) and the
adoption of modern technology and modern nation-state conceptions by puritan groups to further
their own political agendas. Ultimately, El-Fadl indirectly challenges secular notions of
‘moderation,’ while constructing a theological ‘moderate’ Islam integrated, specifically, within
Western culture.

Imam Feisal Abdu Rauf: Sufi Imam and Community Activist
Feisal Abdul Rauf, a Kuwaiti-American Sufi imam and community leader, is most
popularly known for his efforts to build the Park 51 Community Center, also known as the
infamous ‘Ground-Zero Mosque.’ Rauf’s work revolves around improving interfaith community
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relations among Muslims, and bridging the ‘Muslim world’ with the West. He has expressed on
multiple occasions, his effort to foster a “moderate Islam through American idioms.”140
Rosemary Corbett, the author of Making Moderate Islam, details the life and work of Imam
Feisal Abdul Rauf, his mistakes and endeavors in trying to project an American-Muslim dream
mirrored from a Protestant-style of engagement with religion. For Rauf, ‘moderate’ Islam entails
letting go of cultural baggage from back home, and integrating values of neo-liberal democratic
capitalism in the ethos of Western Muslims.
Rauf and his wife, Daisy Khan’s understanding of ‘moderate’ Islam can be found in their
project initiatives, the American Society for Muslim Advancement (ASMA) and the Cordoba
Initiative. Both Rauf and Khan identify as Sufi Muslims, and recognize their brand of Sufism as
‘apolitical’ that focuses on the arts and culture. It is interesting to note, that Sufism contains a
wide appeal among Westerners as it is often culturally appropriated, divorced from Islam, and
seen as ‘exotic mysticism.’141 “Indeed, the ostensible difference between Sufis and ordinary
Muslims, who are supposedly more rigid in their practices and interpretations, has long been part
of Sufism’s appeal.”142 For this reason, the United States, amid the Cold War, “sought client
states” and specifically Sufis, because of the “orientalist idea that Sufis are particularly pliable
and opposed to ‘fundamentalists,’”143 as a part of their foreign policy strategies. Orientalist
notions incorrectly associate Sufism with a type of secular universalism; one that stereotypes
Sufism as romantic and poetic that values intoxication, love, and lust. It is of no wonder that the
best-selling poems in America is the Muslim poet, Rumi.144 However, the themes often evoked
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in Sufi poetry reflect a deep love and connection to Allah, usually referred to as the ‘mysterious
lover,’ to the point of spiritual intoxication.
Yet, the growing interest towards Sufism in the United States has allowed for American
political interests to form coalitions with the ‘moderate’ Muslims they find acceptable, to
advance neo-liberal and capitalist interests. For instance, “Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, the US
representative of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufi Order, who founded the Islamic Supreme
Council of America in 1998—reinforced the tendency among State Department officials to
identify Sufis as peaceful, apolitical, and moderate, and to view all other Muslims as possible
extremists.”145 Although, Rauf and Khan do not necessarily support this particular narrative,
their work seeks to construct a depoliticized Islam streamlined through Sufi spirituality.
Their understanding of Islam allows them to connect on a deeper, spiritual, and universal level
rooted in notions of peaceful religious pluralism. In fact, the very goal of ASMA, is ‘to
strengthen a culturally American expression of Islam based on tolerance and on cultural and
religious harmony and to foster an environment in which Muslims can thrive within a pluralistic
society without compromising their essential values and beliefs.”146 The organization trains
young Muslims “to be spokespersons for a ‘tolerant, harmonious, authentic Islam,’ which means
‘encouraging them to identify with the essentials of the Islamic faith that cut across cultural
boundaries.’”147 Ironically, Rauf and Khan criticize ‘immigrant’ Islam that is attached to cultural
baggage; while calling for a distinctly American brand of Islam for Muslims. The paradox exists
in the very political nature of Rauf’s and Khan’s work, despite their claims of de-politicization.
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Rauf and Khan, both from highly educated and elite backgrounds, value the idea of the
American dream, Protestant ethics of hard work, capitalism, and individualism. Their definition
of moderation very much stems from values found in the free-market, little government
intervention, and privatized religiosity available to the public. Rauf and Khan tend to attract
more affluent Muslim members and converts within their congregation, many who are
“frequently unaware that tensions over resources even existed between Muslim communities in
the United States and (like many affluent Muslims) tend to view calls to address disparity as
immoderate and as the cause of political controversies.”148 The political-theology of Rauf and
Khan fail to address racial and socio-economic inequality. In many respects, the politics of race
and class would be considered extreme for this Sufi group, as it focuses on the politics of
material wealth and identity. Despite Rauf and Khan’s genuine belief in Muslim advancement
through capitalist means, free-market trade relationships between the Muslim world and the
West to bridge differences, and a uniquely American expression of Islam as the ‘moderate’
Islam, they still have not managed to successfully gain the trust of Western political leadership.
Their loyalty and patriotism towards Western values have not quelled Islamophobia. For all the
‘moderate Islam’ that Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf and Daisy Khan advocate, their projects have still
met harsh criticism, as evident in the failure of building the so-called ‘Ground-Zero Mosque.’149

Muqtedar Khan: Traditional-Liberal Political Scientist
Muqtedar Khan, political scientist on the Middle East, and professor at the University of
Delaware, identifies as a ‘traditional’ Muslim for matters on religion, yet politically liberal on
social issues. Khan authored Debating Moderate Islam, a discursive work in which multiple
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scholars debate and define the nature of ‘moderate’ Islam. Khan echoes much of the democratic
establishment rhetoric on moderate Islam. His Clinton and Obama-esque conception on the role
that ‘moderate’ Muslims serve in the West reinforces the trope that good Muslims must fight bad
ones by aiding the state’s security apparatus. For him, the nature of ‘moderate’ Muslims can be
found in the acceptance of secular-democratic institutions and pluralist societies. ‘Moderate’
Islam traces its roots back to the traditional practice of Islamic jurisprudence when multiple
opinions on Islamic law flourished. Today, traditional Islam should look like a democratic and
pluralistic society, where no single worldview dominates the public sphere.
Khan acknowledges the general distaste Muslims have towards labels such as
“moderate,” as it may indicate one who has “politically sold out to the ‘other’ side.”150 The
common sentiment among most Muslims is that “there is no such thing as moderate or radical
Islam; that there is ‘only one Islam’—the true Islam, and all other expressions are falsehoods
espoused by the hypocrites or the apostates.”151 Khan, however, considers this dogmatic and
narrow-minded, as it assumes that the individual making these claims believe that their
interpretation of Islam remains the only authentic one. According to him, moderate Muslims are
“reflective, self-critical, pro-democracy, pro-human rights, and closet secularists. Their
secularism is American in nature,” in that “they believe in the separation of church and state, but
not like the French, who prefer to exile religion from the public sphere.”152 Moderates may vary
in their religiosity, but the defining factor of moderation is in one’s basic attitude towards
democracy. It is for this reason that moderate Muslims should collaborate with the state, against
extremists who are mired in their anti-democratic dogma.
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Khan argues that ‘moderate’ Muslims carry more potential in fighting against the War on
Terror, than they are accredited with. Their “assets” include “human intelligence, cultural
insights, linguistic skills, experience, and awareness of the diversity within the Islamic groups
and movements.”153 Moderate Muslims have the ability to “rescue Islam and innocent Muslims”
from the negative influences of “rogue Islamists,” counter anti-US propaganda, undermine the
legitimacy of extremism, and “provide an alternative understanding of political and global
realities to prevent the perception that the war on terror is a war on Islam.”154 Although Khan
plays into the stereotypical rhetoric that Muslims are inextricably linked to extremism—whether
they are a part of it, or actively fighting against it—he too, has criticized aspects of American
foreign policy. His intentions are derived from his desire to bridge the gap between Muslims and
the West, and to “fix” the errors of American foreign policy with the “Muslim world,” in order to
solve problems of violent extremism.
Despite Khan’s genuine goals for working towards peace, democracy and human rights,
his criticism of Israeli and American foreign policies, have also led to false accusations against
him as a closet extremist and ‘white-washer’ of Shari’a.155 Khan has chosen to embrace the
‘moderate’ Muslim discourse instead of rejecting it, as he sees value in distinguishing moderates
from extremists. For him, ‘moderate’ Islam is a gateway to establishing a prosperous relationship
between Muslims and the West during a time of distrust and violence. It is important for him to
critique religious extremism just as it is necessary to analyze the mistakes of Western foreign
policy. Khan demonstrates that Muslims can be proponents of democracy, human rights,
pluralism and the West, while retaining their religious beliefs. Unlike Abdul Rauf, Khan does not
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outwardly promote neo-liberal free-market capitalism as the benchmark for moderation, but they
both reflect on the notion of religiosity and American political and philosophical values as not
being mutually exclusive from one another.

Tariq Ramadan: Salafi, Academic, Philosopher, and Writer
Tariq Ramadan, perhaps one of the most revolutionary Islamic intellectuals of this time, a
scholar, writer, and philosopher on liberation theology, is an example of someone who promotes
a unique ‘Western Muslim’ identity while thoroughly challenging Western systems of inequality,
oppression, capitalism, and imperialism. While known as one of Europe’s most influential
Muslim philosophers, and also the grand-son of Hassan al-Banna (one of the central founders of
the Muslim Brotherhood), Ramadan’s position is rooted in controversy. Although, the Muslim
Brotherhood, historically, has rejected all forms of Western influence in Islamic practice and
institutions, Ramadan’s goal has been to “develop a Muslim personality in the West.” He
envisions this through a balance of Islamic tradition and modern reform, by looking to the
origins of Islam for “what is unchangeable (thabit) and what is subject to change (mutaghayir)156
in the religion.
Ramadan does not explicitly propose a ‘moderate’ Islam, unlike the other Muslim
personalities mentioned. However, he believes that cultivating a distinct Western Muslim
identity remains key to addressing some of the internal problems faced by Muslims living in the
West. For as long as Western Muslims assume their minority status, their identity, politics,
concerns, and needs will remain marginalized. Cultivating this identity is not necessarily a
construction of moderation, but instead it is the formation of an effective relationship which
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allows for a more empowered Muslim voice in global affairs. Additionally, Ramadan sees no
qualms with a “Western Islam,” as it does not remain distinct from Islamic Islam. By this he
means, that “there is [only] one, Islam, and the fundamental principles that define it are those to
which all Muslims adhere, even though there may be, clothed in Islamic principles, an important
margin allowed for evolution, transformation, and adaptation to various social and cultural
environments.”157 Islam in “Black Africa, North Africa and Asia”158 may look culturally
different from one another, but still exercise core Islamic values that remain universally
undisputed by Muslims; for instance, the oneness of God. Simultaneously, the Western
expression of Islam, while necessary for Muslims living in the West, is not essential to the
development of ‘moderate’ Islam.
Ramadan contends that the moderate discourse today is reductive. Similar to El-Fadl’s
argument, he outlines how Islamic scholars and theologians have historically always engaged in
a rhetoric of moderation when making any legal decision. Choosing the path of moderation, or
the middle of two extremes, has formed much of the backbone of Islamic jurisprudence.
However, in Western societies today, “the practice of day-to-day visibility of religion is close to
zero (even in the United States, where religion as a cultural and moral reference point is
relatively strong),”159 and to, therefore, “speak of daily prayers, fasting…prohibitions and dress
codes is often seen automatically as verging on excess.”160 In this respect, Western notions of
moderation differ from that of practicing Muslims, as for the former, moderation reflects the
invisibility of religion. Ramadan believes that “moderation is multi-dimensional,” and cannot be
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“expressed only with reference to the West or to ‘non-Muslims.’”161 Different societies have
different conceptions of what is ‘moderate’ by their own cultural standards.
Furthermore, Ramadan also criticizes the simplicity behind the usage of the term. For
him, there are two modes of ‘moderation:’ the religious sphere, and the political sphere.
Standards of moderation cannot equally be applied to both, as religious moderation and political
moderation consist of entirely different things—different conditions, contexts, circumstances,
and resources. As already mentioned, religious moderation is dependent upon cultural norms and
contexts. Political moderation, on the other hand, remains highly subjective: while terrorism
against civilian populations in Western cities is considered extreme, colonial occupation in
Muslim countries, state violence and the usage of drones are not.162 Moreover, disconnect
between religious practice and political attitudes exist as well; “There are innumerable cases of
political personalities, intellectuals and civil society activists who are indeed Muslims with
liberal views and practices (in regards to religion), but who publicly support the most hardline
dictatorial regimes and/or the most violent resistance groups everywhere from Algeria to
France.”163 And so, ‘moderate’ is not only reductive as it simplifies the diversity of theology,
law and politics, but “moderation in religion cannot be correlated with its supposed political
equivalent,” even though “there is a tendency to conflate these categories.”164
Although Ramadan does not define ‘moderation,’ as he believes any definition is a futile
attempt at limiting diversity of opinions, he believes that “religious moderation, however it is
defined, is perfectly compatible with a radical, non-violent, democratic political stance that
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rejects all forms of domination, exploitation, and oppression.”165 He defines his personal
religious orientation as that of a Salafi-reformist—one who adheres to an unmediated reading of
the Qur’an and Sunna, refers back to the practices of the Muslims of the first generations, and
also uses reason and personal ijtihad166 to develop practices that are contextual to the current
social environment. Unlike Salafi-literalists, also akin to Wahhabis, who reject the system of
jurisprudence and rely on selective and literalist readings directly from religious scriptures,
reformists opt for a balance between tradition and modernity, classical methodology and
personal reason. Ramadan may not explicitly call this “moderate,” but in many respects, his way
of thinking suggests that this is how he conceives of ‘moderation’ in his own practice.
Unfortunately, Ramadan too, like many well-intentioned practicing Muslim personalities, has
been a suspect of harboring extremist sentiments and carrying a national security threat by the
American government.

Wrapping-Up the Debate
Debating on ‘moderation’ has become integral for Western Muslim personalities. Many
of them, however, hold widely different views regarding the ‘moderate’ discourse; but, the
common thread is their conception of ‘moderation’ from the lens of integration and citizenship
without compromising Islamic religious or moral values. El-Fadl’s theological differentiation of
‘moderates’ from ‘puritans,’ Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf’s ‘moderate’ American Islam rooted in
Protestant ethics of democratic-capitalism, Muqtedar Khan’s politically secular-and-liberal, yet
practicing Muslim ‘moderate,’ or Tariq Ramadan’s anti-imperialist, yet democratic ‘moderate,’
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all suggest ways of being Muslim in the West. There is a value in trying to define ‘moderation’
among practicing Muslims, as it opposes the more Western-secular definition of it. It allows for
Muslims to practice Islam as they want, and counter any stigma associated with Islamic
practices. Defining ‘moderation’ by standards set by Muslims, allows for active political
participation in Western society without fear of religious discrimination. For each of the
individuals mentioned, ‘moderation’ is a way to appeal to the West and gain trust, by
differentiating one’s self from a more ‘foreign’ Islam. Despite the well-intentioned attempts to
bridge Islam and the West from each Muslim personality mentioned, none have been completely
successful in gaining the trust of Western politicians. Their acceptance of liberal Western values
such as human rights, yet criticism of Western policies in the Middle East and Israel, have all led
to accusations of extremism against them. It is evident, that ‘moderation’ is inextricably tied to
the Western political landscape.

Conclusion
So, what is moderation? And who gets to decide? Modernization theory assumes that as
society progresses and modernizes, society will become less religious, more secular and more
‘moderate.’ Not only has this been disproven, but it also simplifies notions of the secular.
Casanova, among many other theorists, argue that secularism manifests differently in diverse
societies, as do concepts of modernity. Modernity is not a linear development with a set standard
of prerequisites. It would be incorrect to assume that moderation occurs from the sole result of
liberalism and secularism. Despite these misconceptions, these concepts have become
internalized among Westerners. As a result, many assume that non-Westernized traditions are
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backward, illiberal, immoderate, and sometimes barbaric. Unfortunately, Islamic traditions have
been defined under this category of “non-Western backwardness.”
Defining ‘moderation,’ however, has become politicized. There is a political investment
in this term, because it has the power to legitimize Islam among Westerners, and construct
Muslims according to Western standards. Since 9/11, Islam has consistently been seen in relation
to terrorism and extremism. These associations, while unreasonable, have become prevalent in
the West, to the point where introducing ‘moderate’ Islam has become a necessity for Western
political interests to counter the ‘Islamic’ extremism. Extremism is associated with any political
activity by Muslims that criticize Western politics. While most people would argue that
extremism requires violence, there exists a fear in the West, that critical Muslims are prone to
extremism, or ‘closet’ extremists. This has not only made being Muslim in the West more
difficult, but it subconsciously coerces Muslims to be and act in ways to gain Western trust. As a
result, Muslims have also absorbed the ‘moderate’ discourse. Muslim personalities attempt to
reclaim this term in order to safeguard Islamic values and Western citizenship. The debate over
authoritatively defining ‘moderation’ has become a discursive battlefield—one that questions
Islam’s presence in the West, and one that separates Muslims from the non-West.
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Chapter 3: Western Policies and the Makings of the
‘Moderate’ Muslim
Islam needs to reform, and it needs to start with the ‘moderate’ Muslims. This sentiment
can be found in the rhetoric of many liberal personalities, atheists and secular Muslims, including
Bill Maher, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Asra Nomani, and Zuhdi Jasser. These individuals often argue in
public media that Islam is inherently problematic with extremist tendencies, and the only way to
solve this “issue” is to create a more ‘moderate’ interpretation of Islam grounded in Western
values of liberalism and secularism—in other words, to understand Islam not literally as “God’s
word,” but as a historical byproduct of social-political-and-economic consequences.167 As
argued in the previous chapter, the word, ‘moderate,’ serves as a tool of legitimacy and authority
over Islam. Because the term implies an inherent ‘goodness’—everything in moderation—both
‘traditional’ Muslims and Western secularists engage in this discourse of the “moderate,” for
reasons that advance each group’s own interests.
No current religious group discusses their faith or identity as one that is ‘moderate’
except for Muslims. For other religious groups, it is implied that extremists fall outside of the
typical practices of religion. However, Muslims and non-Muslims feel compelled to use the term
‘moderate,’ when describing ‘non-extremist’ Muslims. Devout practicing Muslims for instance,
will assert that Islam by nature is ‘moderate’168 and flexible, as witnessed in Islamic
jurisprudential history and Islam’s Golden Age. On the other hand, secular-liberal personalities,
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like Bill Maher, want ‘moderate’ Muslims to disavow parts of their faith that do not align with
liberal values.169 Feminists, like Asra Nomani, and atheists, like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, want moderate
Muslims to reform Islam through more secular interpretations because of their aversion to the
conservative cultures they personally grew up in.170 Secular Muslim spokespeople like Zuhdi
Jasser, call for Western intervention to secularize Muslim societies and dismantle all forms of
Islamist171 politics.172 Politicians ask ‘moderate’ Muslims to affirm their political loyalties to the
state,173 and law enforcement recruits ‘moderates’ to spy on conservative Muslims in the name of
national security.174 Whether echoed through secular Muslim reformers or non-Muslim liberals,
it is a fact, that many Western governments actively engage in policies to reform Islam to further
neo-liberal interests. Consequently, lay Muslims absorb the political rhetoric initiated by the
West because of their desire to live peacefully in a plural society where they are not viewed as a
threat.
The previous chapter details various discourses over what ‘moderation’ entails; but what
are the policies that actively lead to its fruition? Is it merely constructed rhetoric? Alternatively,
are there tangible policies that coerce a particular kind of ‘moderation?’ Intimidation,
Islamophobia, and policies in the name of secularism and national security have fostered, not
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only the creation of the “moderate” Muslim, but also the legitimation of the Western worldview
onto non-Western lands.
Institutional ‘Islamo-Racism’
Following the decline of Soviet Russia, post-Cold War, many Soviet-allied geopolitically
positioned Muslim nations in the Middle East, had been left stranded in a new international
system dominated by American and Western interests. This “splintering” had cast “Muslim
nations who had mastered the game of survival by playing the US against the Soviet Union,
wondering about their future,”175 their security, and freedoms. The Iranian Revolution of 1979176
coupled with the ‘Salman Rushdie Affair’ in 1989,177 plus the absence of a global power in
opposition to the US, ushered a new era on the war against ‘Islamic’ extremism. The new global
climate and Western foreign policies regarding Muslim-majority countries not only “brought
about dramatic changes in the comfort zone of Muslims,” but also led Muslims “to feel targeted
by the Western media as intolerant and unfit for citizenship in the United States.”178 Contrary to
the popular belief, that discrimination against Muslims was catalyzed by 9/11 and the War on
Terror, Islamo-racist policies, arguably, began following the reshaping of the new order of
international politics following the end of the Cold War.
Many Muslims will argue that Islamo-Racism began with the Western colonialism of
Muslim lands following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. What was supposed to
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signal a new phase of sovereignty among predominantly Muslim Arab nations, turned out to be a
new phase of Western mandate systems, partitions, and artificially “carving out” Middle Eastern
states into political provinces in unprecedented ways.179 At times, “Western expansion into
Muslim territories is…depicted as having a religious agenda carried out by colonial bureaucrats
and Christian missionaries…who sought to liberate Muslims from Islam.”180 Western
colonialism was viewed as an invasion of Muslim lands to defame Islam, by promoting “ethnic
and sectarian divisions as part of the policy to divide and rule,” and instilling Western notions of
superiority.181 The invasion of Muslim lands and stirring ethnic conflict may be categorized as
overt racism through colonial aggression; but what does modern-day institutional Islamo-racism
look like?
Islamo-racism is premised upon the idea that the racialization of Muslims and their
perceived image (hijab and burka-clad women, stereotypical brown features on angry-looking
Arab men, etc) are linked to their inherent backwardness. The Muslim people are an inferior,
intolerant, and dangerous people; this orientalization of Muslims contributes to prejudice,
bigotry, and discrimination against them—but, how can discrimination against Islam, a religious
tradition, be considered racism? Moustafa Bayoumi, an English professor at Brooklyn College,
in his award-winning book, This Muslim American Life: Dispatches from the War on Terror,
shares the story of Ahmed Hassan, one of the first cases of an Arab-Muslim immigrant
petitioning for naturalization. The judge, Arthur J. Tuttle, “based his determination of Hassan’s
whiteness not principally on the color of his skin, but primarily on the fact that he was an Arab
and Islam is the dominant religion among Arabs,” thus assuming his Islam would prevent him
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from assimilation. While Arabs had no racial classification at this time, the Naturalization Act
(1790-1952) “had limited citizenship to ‘free white persons, but without exactly defining what
makes a white person.”182 These instances, found in both history and the present, indicate that
“religion determines race.”183 While racism is often perceived as an overt system of
discrimination and violence, institutional racism manifests differently in the form of
discriminatory state policies under the guise of upholding national security and culture. Some
elements of modern-day institutional Islamo-racism can be found in Western immigration and
security policies, racial profiling, and political rhetoric.
Although Islamo-racism has existed throughout the orientalized European version of
history towards their Eastern counterpart, the post 9/11 discourse undoubtedly reflects the
increasingly evident policies of state-sanctioned Islamo-racism within Western societies. As a
matter of fact, Islamo-racism fuels the discourse surrounding ‘moderate’ Islam, as it forces a new
state-sanctioned Muslim identity in order to wither away traces of “Muslim-ness” that the state
finds threatening. For instance, the Bush administration, following the twin tower attacks,
“made it clear that it expected ‘moderate’ governments to implement other measures to ensure
American interests,” including but not limited to, “curbing free speech” considered
“‘inflammatory’ if it was directed against American or Israeli policies.”184 Officials within the
administration, from Paul Wolfowitz, the U.S deputy secretary of defense to Daniel Pipes,
Conservative commentator on the Middle East, “weighed in on how to promote moderate
Islam.”185 Wolfowitz suggested the US act as an invisible third party sponsoring the ‘moderate’
Muslim voice (and by ‘moderate’ Muslim voice, he means Muslims who show unequivocal
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support for American policies of national interest) in leading the battle among all Muslims. By
their definition, a ‘moderate’ Muslim is one who would have supported the overall campaign to
fight “terror” in Muslim regions—this “terror,” also known as, illegitimate excuses to invade
lands for geopolitical dominance and resources.
In an encounter narrated by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad in her book, Becoming American,
President Bush allegedly, “sent personal messages to Islamic scholars, including Shaykh Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, asking them to ‘delete those verses and sayings’” seen as “‘inappropriate from the
Qur’an.’”186 Additionally, “‘President Bush pushed far off his crusade, thinking Islamic
education must stop.’”187 For a majority of Muslims in the world, the Qur’an is the inimitable
and unchallenged word of God, which stands throughout time. To have the courage to ask
Islamic scholars to remove certain verses according to what an American President believes is
appropriate, speaks to the level of disconnect between Muslims and Western governments. While
Bush may not be representative of all Western individuals, his status as a world leader (at that
time) shows the cognitive dissonance of the West’s values and relationship with Islam. On one
hand, it advocates for both freedom of religion, and on the other, a state-promoted ‘moderate’
Islam; as Bush called Islam a “religion of peace,” but also asked to make moderations to Islam.
Islamo-Racist Security Measures
Some institutional Islamo-racist policies under the Bush Administration include the USA
PATRIOT Act, enhanced security measures, and the Anti-Terrorism Act—all which have
legalized infringing on the civil liberties of Arabs and Muslims on American soil. The PATRIOT
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Act (Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) had “lifted all
legal protection of liberty for Muslims and Arabs…, [and] sanctioned the monitoring and
surveillance of Muslims without notification.”188 The Anti-Terrorism Act “had sanctioned the
incarceration of Arabs and Muslims with ‘secret’ evidence,” and most times, with no evidence at
all.189 Not only did this indiscriminately target Arabs, Muslims, and those who looked Arab or
Muslim, but it also led to their indefinite detention, and torture in offshore American prisons like
Guantanamo Bay. These instances have broken families apart, silenced Muslim communities
into fear, and formed suppressed outrage. The fear of being spied upon, expressing political
opinions, being at the wrong place at the wrong time, or having one’s child influenced by a
controversial crowd are all internalized fears among most Muslim families, especially immigrant
Muslim families, living in the West. However, “this paradigm hasn’t changed under Obama.”190
In fact, “the surveillance structures that stand atop have expanded, and the explicit derision of
Islam expressed by Bush, and perfected by Donald Trump, are sugar-coated with tolerant
language, Ramadan dinners, and belated mosque visits.”191
Other instances of Islamo-racism are found within the law enforcement. The longstanding tension between Muslims and NYPD demonstrate internalized orientalism of the state,
and the effects of top-down policies from the state into local police force. In 2007, the NYPD
published a public report titled “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.”192
Although, the report has been purged, and no longer remains the standard criteria for determining
the process of radicalization, it reflects the internalization of Islamo-racism among law
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enforcement and their oversimplifications of Islam, religiosity and Salafism. According to the
report, certain ‘behavioral changes’ among Muslim youth can apparently determine their
likeliness towards radicalism. The report specifically targets Muslims who identify with a more
Salafi strain; Salafis, a more socially-conservative group, typically approach Islam with a more
egalitarian lens believing that anyone can understand the Qur’an without requiring jurists as
mediators, and seek to practice Islam traced back to the practices of the Prophet and his
Companions in a more literal way. The NYPD report refers to this as “Jihadi-Salafi ideology,”
and argues that this particular strain is the catalyzing factor that influences one to carry out acts
of terror.193 Although the report acknowledges a superficial difference between non-violent
Salafis and ‘Jihadist-Salafis,’ the language used in the report, nonetheless, oversimplifies “signs
of radicalization” and blurs the image of practicing Muslims with ‘Jihadist-Salafis.’ It also marks
an interest in general Salafism, as the first step towards radicalism, therefore, implying (1) there
is, supposedly, an exact scientific process that leads to radicalization, and (2) that Muslims who
have an internal desire to uphold a religious community (most Muslims, whether Salafi or not),
abide by Prophetic standards, and create a more unified Muslim community are inherently
threats.
By NYPD standards, “key indicators” that an individual is progressing along the
“radicalization continuum” are directly correlated to how religious one is becoming. Taken
directly from the report, these include, but are not limited to:194
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•

Progression or gravitation towards Salafi Islam

•

Regular Attendance at a Salafi mosque

•

Becoming alienated from one’s ‘former’ life; affiliating with like-minded individuals

•

Joining or forming a group of like-minded individuals in a quest to strengthen one’s
dedication to Salafi Islam

•

Giving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling, and urban hip-hop gangster clothes

•

Wearing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard

•

Becoming involved in social activism and community issues.

Not only is this list absurd, but it targets anyone who seems to change their life around,
express more piety, and involve themselves in community activism (as if any of these are
negative actions). It enforces the belief that attaching one’s self deeply to Islam, or any form of
political or social activity is viewed as threatening. This report conflates exploring one’s faith
and religiosity with radicalization, and incorrectly assumes that any political identity rooted in
Islamic values is equivalent to extremist beliefs.
Islamic Garb as a Terror Threat
As of recent, the highest European Court ruled that it is legal for employers to ban hijabs
from the workplace—a controversial political decision that will make it more difficult for
observant Muslim women to find jobs.195 This decision comes after a series of controversies that
have taken place throughout Europe, and the infamous “burkini ban” in France—an incident that
prompted French law enforcement to force a woman to remove her burkini publicly on a beach,
resulting in her humiliation.196 Although, French courts have ruled the ban unconstitutional,
France’s mayors refuse to overturn their rulings, citing security threats as their motivating
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reason, and their “response to growing terror concerns.” 197 Furthermore, top French officials
including the current Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, called the burkini a “symbol of the
enslavement of women.”198 These two incidents, coupled with France’s hijab ban from public
institutions illustrate the secular state’s aggressive social policies to regulate religious expression
in the public sphere, and forcibly assimilate Muslim minorities to secular culture at the expense
of their personal freedoms, otherwise arguing that Muslims and Islam remain a threat to national
security if they adhere to their traditional customs.
Joan Wallach Scott, an American historian who focuses on France, delves into the
controversy regarding Islamic garb in her work, The Politics of the Veil. She analyzes French
opinions, politics, and philosophies that maintain justifications for banning the veil, and argues
that these sentiments are rooted in orientalist racism. According to French officials, “the veil is
an emblem of radical Islamist politics… the symbol of the clash of cultures… [And] Islam’s
resistance to modernity.”199 Furthermore, assimilating to French standards of physical
appearance is the only way to be a proper French citizen, and maintain French unity and equality.
Wearing the veil symbolizes a break from mainstream French culture; a sign of difference, and
therefore, inequality. Unlike American values of multiculturalism, Scott highlights that the
French find multiculturalism divisive and chaotic.200 French universalism posits a single national
identity, culture, and customs, and vehemently denounces any group affiliation outside of French
nationalism. One can argue, that their secularism is the equivalent of their state enforced religion.
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One of the first instances of Islamo-racist policies targeting veiled Muslim women in
France occurred in 1989, known as the affaires des foulards, when three Muslim girls refused to
take off their headscarves at their middle school when asked by school officials.201 During this
time, the Salman Rushdie Affair and Arab militant movements garnered international attention—
therefore, the headscarf was immediately associated with ties to jihadist movements through a
symbolic solidarity. As ludicrous as it sounds, middle-school-aged Muslim girls were viewed as
terror threats for wearing the hijab, and distracted from receiving a proper education. Moreover,
headscarf controversies similar to this flare up every few years in France, and are usually
correlated to periods of international tension with Middle Eastern regions.
Scott argues that the politicization of the veil can be traced back to the Algerian wars of
independence from French colonization. The development of the veil as a symbol of anticolonial resistance originated with the re-veiling of non-religious women who played an active
role in the fight against the occupying French power. Throughout colonial history, women in
Algeria and other Muslim colonies were viewed through an orientalist lens as veiled, oppressed,
and hypersexual. Gender segregation and covered women frustrated French colonists as these
women remained hidden and inaccessible to Frenchmen. Erotic depictions of the harem were
conjured in the minds of colonists, as places filled with highly sexual and sensual activity,
promiscuous and exotic women. Even though Frenchmen were never exposed to the reality of
these all-women spaces, they managed to capitalize on these stereotypes in the form of fictional
story-telling, post-cards for tourists, and scholarship. Muslim and Arab women plagued the
fantasies and fetishes of French settlers—access to Algerian prostitutes were, therefore, viewed
as treasures won in colonial conquest. Over time, secularizing and unveiling Algerian women
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were viewed by the French as liberating them from the stronghold of the barbaric wretches of
Islam—a win for the white French man’s moral ego. It is only natural, that when the anticolonial resistance in Algeria began to surge with the re-veiling of women, the French ego was
shattered. Veiling during the independence wars was seen as resistance to Westernization and
colonialism. Frantz Fanon, a prominent French-Algerian revolutionary and psychologist most
famously known for his radical work, The Wretched of the Earth, describes this phenomenon as
the following:
In the beginning, the veil was a mechanism of resistance, but its value for the social
group remained very strong. The veil was worn because tradition demanded a rigid
separation of the sexes, but also because the occupier was bent on unveiling Algeria.202

Controversies surrounding the hijab ban have a deeply entrenched history rooted in
Western foreign policies of intervention. Veiled women are viewed as the carriers of tradition,
and threats to the secular polity. Even though a small minority of Muslim women in France wear
the hijab, the assault on their civil liberties is indicative of state coercion in constructing the
appropriate citizen—the acceptable Muslim, and assimilated patriot. The “French law banning
the display of religious symbols (particularly the veil) in public schools may be taken as another
example of how a self-avowed secular state has come to define what religious and nonreligious
attire is in the public domain (something normatively considered a matter of personal choice
within liberalism).”203 These inconsistencies are not without motive. While France may argue
that these policies are applied equally among all religious groups, and not targeting Muslims
specifically, there exists a history of European governments actively involved in policies
attempting to reform Islam. “European governments since the early 1990s have been engaged in
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a process of ‘domesticating’ Islam by attempting to sever its transnational ties and selectively
encourage a state-sanctioned form of Islamic identity. The government-sponsored
institutionalization and cooption of previously decentralized, transnational Islamic institutions is,
in effect, a way of imprinting European values and norms on a resistant Muslim population.”204
Manufacturing Islamo-Racist Rhetoric
Although institutional Islamo-racism can manifest through policies that directly target the
livelihoods and personal liberties of Muslims or Arabs, manufacturing Islamo-racist rhetoric
serves as a key component in legitimizing certain attitudes towards Muslims. Repeated public
rhetoric among influential individuals in civil society organizations, has the power to shape
narratives as factual and authoritative, thereby moving public discourse. Politicians choose their
words carefully to construct stories and histories about their nations, construct villains through
tactful terminology, and create “facts” based on their worldviews. The power of rhetoric, as
studied by many political scientists, has the ability to demonize or glorify entire groups based on
the subjective view of the nation’s interest. Noam Chomsky, renowned linguist, argues that
corporate news fuels propaganda in democracies by leaving particular pieces of information out,
and focusing on bits it believes to generate more profit—in other words, corporate “propaganda
is to democracy what violence is to a dictatorship.”205 It may not come as a surprise then, that
manufacturing Islamophobic and Islamo-racist rhetoric consists of more than a 57-million-dollar
industry.206
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Developing Islamo-racist rhetoric is composed of an intricate system filled with donors,
non-profit organizations, celebrity spokespeople and the secular ‘moderate’ Muslims desired by
Western political interests. In other words, this system can be described as “a maneuvering rankand-file, inside and outside of government, who are further embedding the very "good versus
bad" Muslim binary that has long plagued Muslims in America, and diminished their citizenship
and how Muslim identity is seen and understood.”207 FearInc, a website dedicated to researching
the “Islamophobia network,” following money trails, and identifying prominent Islamophobic
individuals and their connections to one another, has released a report detailing the methodical
construction of Islamophobic rhetoric.
According to the report, the Islamophobia network is maintained through top funders,
comprised mainly of eight wealthy donors since 2001, donating to organizations invested in the
“Muslim binary.” These organizations claim to be fighting against “Islamic extremism,” while
simultaneously engaging in rhetoric that conflates traditionally practicing Muslims with
radicalism. For instance, the Clarion Project, although led by a group of executives with a
Muslim background, also perpetuate similar sentiments regarding Islamic garb and the hijab as
expressed by the French government, calling it a form of oppression and extremism, thereby,
enforcing a specific Western secular brand of Islam. Oftentimes, these organizations (i.e. the
Clarion Project, the Middle East Forum, the David Horowitz Freedom Center, the Center for
Security Policy, etc.) work in conjunction with one another, disseminate each other’s material,
and financially support one another.208 Prominent Conservative individuals, or “misinformation
experts,” propagate the information created by these organizations as spokespeople. These
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individuals include Daniel Pipes, David Horowitz, David Yerushalmi, Frank Gaffney, Robert
Spencer, and Steven Emerson—many of whom, have worked under the Bush administration, and
others as policy advisors.
This network of organizations and individuals further takes form in top-down
misinformation circulation, seeping into an “echo chamber” that publicizes the propaganda
through foundations, validators, activists, right-wing religious groups, and allies to solidify the
“Muslim binary.”209 Well-known foundations and faces consist of JihadWatch, ACT! For
American Education, the American-Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD), Stop Islamization of
America, Pamela Geller, Brigitte Gabriel, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Zuhdi Jasser, and more. Some of the
prominent politicians associated with these individuals and groups include former representatives
Michelle Bachman, Peter King, Governor Bobby Jindal, and Rep. Louie Gohmert. In addition,
some of the influential media outlets are Fox News, the Christian Broadcasting Network, the
Washington Times, the National Review, Sean Hannity, Mark Savage, etc. All familiar faces,
whether on television, college campuses, or policy advisory boards, this network helps
implement negative correlations between practicing Muslims and extremism, and aids in the
execution of Islamo-racist policies.
Daniel Pipes, one of the leading misinformation experts on Islam and the Middle East,
was appointed by Bush to provide a set of criteria on what constitutes a moderate Muslim.
According to his ‘rubric,’ “Muslims have to renounce certain teachings of their faith.”210
However, he also asserts that Islamic laws are similar to Talmudic laws found in Israel, “a state
he generally defends as modern, democratic, and secular.”211 This then causes one to wonder:
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why Muslims and not Jews? Arguably, Israel’s more-than-close alliance with the United States,
Western political interests, and geo-political policing of Arab Middle-Eastern nations, have
created a double standard between perceptions of Muslims and perceptions of Jews. However, a
look into the history of anti-Semitism in Europe shows that Jews too, have experienced similar
treatment with state-sponsored investments into constructing the ‘appropriate Jew,’ and
manufacturing Judeophobia by fabricating notions of Jewish extremism found to be inherent
among traditional Jews.212 These patterns in history that are replicated in modern day show that
Western political powers can fashion any religious group into their own image under the pretense
of national security.
Islamo-racist rhetoric spreads fear and prejudice, among both Muslims and non-Muslims
living in the West. Muslims learn to internalize orientalist tropes regarding their own group, and
conflate spiritual and faithful aspects of the religion with politicized elements like oppression
and extremism. For instance, the hijab—a head covering that historically has symbolized
modesty, humbleness, and connectedness to God by taming one’s ego, beauty, and materialism
of the self—has come to represent the oppression of women, the active symbol of antiWesternism, and the enablement of extremist views. Seeking a Muslim community of devout
followers who desire to implement Shari’a—the path that leads one closest to God—into their
personal lives, has come to resemble totalitarianism, tyranny, and barbarity. Islamo-racist
rhetoric, has managed to create an alternate reality of alternative facts, grounded in
misinformation and political agendas.
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The Token ‘Moderate’ Muslims of the West
The Rand Corporation’s report, Building Moderate Muslim Networks,213 develops a
blueprint strategy for how Western governments should go about fostering ‘moderation’ among
Muslims. The report takes a Cold-War approach to the issue, only this time, replacing
Communist ideology, with that of ‘radical Islam.’ During the Cold War, the US government
funneled money into fostering “democratic intellectual movements”214 in strategic geopolitically
positioned regions of the world to counter Communist influence. The report suggests that a
similar approach should be taken by the US to oppose radicalism—by building up ‘moderate’
Muslim networks to counter extremist ideologies. It implies giving particular ‘moderate’
Muslims a thorough platform, proper funds, and the ability to adequately disseminate
propaganda that promotes American political interests under the guise of “democratic
education…pluralistic values from Islamic texts and traditions, moderate media, gender equality,
etc.” This “effective implementation…requires the creation of an institutional structure within
the US government to guide, oversee, and monitor the effort.”215 Furthermore, the language of
the report distinguishes “true moderates from extremists camouflaged as moderates.”216 This
suggests that one can only be “moderate” according to Western definitions.
The Rand report targets five groups as “potential building blocks” for the ‘moderate’
Muslim network. Those who are: “liberal and secular Muslim academics and intellectuals;
young, moderate religious scholars; community activists; women’s groups engaged in gender
equality campaigns; and moderate journalists and writers.”217 On the surface-level, it seems as if
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these groups are engaged in progressive work for the betterment of society. Conversely, these
groups are the same ones who profit off the Islamo-racist network. Never mind the fact that most
traditionally practicing Muslims also believe in women’s rights, human rights, non-violent
activism, and progressive ideas. However, oftentimes, token secular Muslim personalities,
including Zuhdi Jasser, Asra Nomani, Ayaan Hirsi Ali (ex-Muslim), Irshad Manji, and the like,
are used as Muslim authorities on the religion—insiders who give the movement to further
Western interests legitimacy, by using a specific rhetoric of democracy and radicalism, good
Muslim and bad. “These Muslim moderates, who are functionally wed to the notion that
extremism is exclusive to Islam, and radicalization limited to Muslim actors, are the ‘terrorhating’ Muslim Americans that Hillary Clinton called out to on April 26.”218
Even though each of these figures contain Muslim backgrounds and particular
experiences with Islam, they, by no means, are scholars of the religion or its historical contexts.
Some, like Irshad Manji, refer to themselves as Muslim reformists who challenge Islam through
ijtihad. Manji refers to ijtihad as an individual feat of intellectual freedom of interpretation,
without relying on sources outside of the Qur’an. Individuals like her, often use Islamic
terminology and methodology in a superficial manner, to push for a Western-liberal reading of
the religion, while simultaneously disparaging traditionally practicing Muslims, women who
wear hijab, etc. They also paint issues found among Muslims as inherently “Muslim” problems,
rather than problems rooted in socio-economic and political conditions—therefore, their
“reformist” title.
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Reforming Islam implies that Islam needs to reform because it is, by its very nature,
problematic; that parts of the Qur’an—a revelation believed to be the inherent word of God by a
majority of Muslims—need to be either taken out, or re-interpreted entirely different from the
original language it is written in. Reforming Islam suggests that Muslims need to stop practicing
their faith, and adopt a Western-approved practice—because the West is best and contains an
objective authority on truth and morals. This self-internalized orientalism among token Muslim
personalities is detrimental as it further fragments the Muslim community, based on politicized
differences. Token Muslim personalities are usually tied to right-wing political groups—the
same conservative groups who do not themselves identify as liberal nor advocate for an equal
application of human rights among all groups, as these token Muslim personalities criticize Islam
for. This cognitive dissonance, and inconsistency demonstrates that “secular” and “liberal”
‘moderate’ Muslims, serve a political purpose, more so, than a religious reformation of
spirituality.
Zuhdi Jasser, the founder of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD) and cofounder of the Muslim Reform Movement (MRM) describes his work as “engaging in a war of
ideas against the ideology of political Islam.”219 Although he specializes in medicine and
cardiology, he is referred to as an authority on Muslim affairs by the government, and on
multiple corporate news channels including Fox, CNN, CBS, MSNBC, etc. An outspoken
supporter of Israel, and devout patriot of the United States, Jasser is vehemently against the idea
of Muslims holding any political views influenced by their religious traditions. He has coopted
terminology of right-wing pundits, and stereotypes most Muslims to be “Islamists,” or followers
of a dangerous political Islam shared by extremists. This is problematic for several reasons, as it,
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again, conflates practicing Muslims with political opinions critical of Western foreign policies
with violent extremists. His organization enforces the idea that Muslims, although incredibly
marginalized and stigmatized, are the only perpetrators of violence, cannot be victims of state
violence, and should only hold political views in support of the state. Ironically, Jasser sees no
problem with human rights abuses from Israel’s political Judaism, or the religiously inspired
politics of Western Conservatives. On one hand, Jasser claims he is no scholar of Islam, Shari’a,
or jurisprudence. On the other, he has no qualms with criticizing Shari’a, and distorts ijtihad
(jurisprudence) for his own goals. Jasser believes that followers of Islam should be apolitical,
and focus on spirituality. However, his support for the Republican Party, advisory decisions to
Homeland Security and alliance with right-wing politicians and political organizations attest that
Jasser is as much of a political Muslim as an “Islamist”—the only difference lies in their politics.
Token Muslims, like Jasser, give a legitimate face to institutional Islamo-racism. By
utilizing individuals who carry a Muslim title, it is assumed that they are authoritative
spokespeople on Islam’s traditions. Their educational background and level of Islamic
scholarship are seldom taken into account. Instead, their personal experiences—either strict
parents, conservative culture, or interactions with certain individuals—completely shape their
narratives on Islam and lead to the generalization of over 1.6 billion people as a monolith. Most
Muslims, whether ‘moderate’ by practicing Muslim standards or by Western standards,
overwhelmingly denounce violence extremism and terrorism. Nonetheless, practicing Muslims,
Muslims who pray five times a day, grow their beard, attend masjid, wear hijab, and remain
critical of politics are viewed with suspicion, danger, and associated with terrorism. The
difference between these groups lie not in their condemnation of violent extremism, but in their
relationship to American politics. Denouncing American foreign policy and state discrimination
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creates an atmosphere of resentment among a marginalized community—Western policy-makers
are more fearful of this resentment, than reforming their policies that lead to the creation of
prejudice, bigotry, and extremism. When token Muslims exist, Western Islamo-racism is
justified.
Conclusion
Manufacturing the good, ‘moderate’ Muslim is rooted in institutional Islamo-racism.
Islamo-racism can manifest in a multitude of ways—from hate crimes, state violence,
discriminatory policies, rhetoric, and media. Islamo-racism has the effect of silencing
communities, and coercing individuals into fitting a particular mold—the mold of the
appropriate, acceptable, and patriotic Muslim citizen. Making the ‘moderate’ Muslim through a
system of intricate networks leads to two things: (1) an inauthentic depiction of what a Muslim
should be like according to a particular framework, and (2) the normalization of Islamo-racism.
Moreover, making the ‘moderate’ Muslim is constructed through a specific language of national
security, extremism, human rights, and women’s rights. It is a system of double standards and
inconsistent values. The West speaks of women’s rights, yet, Muslim women who choose to
wear the hijab are considered threats. Simultaneously, secularism posits freedom of expression,
yet, certain religious expressions are found questionable and subject to extra scrutiny and
security.
Why is manufacturing the ‘moderate’ Muslim a desired concept? Most Muslims
denounce extremism, but the West still stigmatizes Muslims for practicing their traditions and
holding political views. Contrary to common perception, ‘moderation’ is not simply about
extremism, even though it falls back on extremism as its primary argument. Making the
‘moderate’ Muslim is creating, what is falsely advertised as, an apolitical Muslim—one who
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does not use religiously inspired values to inform politics; but, one who also loudly advocates for
secular principles of American democracy and capitalism disguised under values of “human
rights, women’s rights, and freedom.” It is worth noting that the talk of human rights and
freedom, while usually spoken in universal terms, remains subjective in its actual application.
Any criticism against Western or Israeli human rights abuses and intervention in democratic
sovereignty is a “stark illustration of how liberal multiculturalism can accommodate tolerance,
but cannot tolerate affirmations of humanity that impede the practice of US and Israeli
exceptionalism.”220 Making the ‘moderate’ Muslim is making a politicized Muslim; one who is
politically pro-Western neo-liberalism.

220

Steven Salaita. Facebook. January 25, 2017. Accessed April 24, 2017.

87

Conclusion
What is a ‘moderate’ Muslim? Should we even use the term ‘moderate?’ What images
come to mind? For some, ‘moderation’ is as simple as practicing religion non-violently, and
tolerating the differences of others. For others, ‘moderation’ lies in the careful balance of faith
between extremes. For more powerful actors, ‘moderation’ is about the political loyalties and
values Muslims hold towards the West—after all, only extremists are the ones who hold resentful
attitudes against Western intervention. I do not propose my own definition of ‘moderation,’ as I
believe it will contribute to an already problematic discourse. However, it has been my goal to
muddy the waters, to challenge a common rhetoric, and to create cognizance of popular language
riddled with political undertones becoming a normal and seemingly harmless part of the
mainstream.
More importantly, my main objective in writing this thesis is to expose how this
discourse: (1) remains harmful to the Muslim community globally as it proves to be divisive, (2)
creates attitudes of Western exceptionalism among Muslims, (3) disparages Muslims for
criticizing abuses perpetrated by Western governments, and (4) legitimizes Western hegemony
as a global force for good, without serious reflection on the impact of being occupying powers
that has led to more global violence. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the recent outbreak
in Syria, Libya, and Yemen relate to the construction and deconstruction of Muslim political
identities. Although these conflicts contain multiple elements that result in the failure of Western
foreign policy, it remains necessary to examine popular and orientalist rhetoric that normalize
Western violence in the “Muslim world,” as it is one of the many contributing factors to conflict
in the “Muslim World.” Constructing the ‘moderate’ Muslim is a part of this orientalist rhetoric.
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Moreover, these interventions typically require some stamp of approval among ‘moderate’
Muslims (as defined by states), and fuel violent religious divisions among Muslims along
political fault lines.
Some may wonder: why the Muslims? After all, no one refers to ‘good’ Christians and
Jews as ‘moderate.’ On the contrary, state-sponsored constructions of appropriate religious
identities are not a new phenomenon. Throughout 20th century European history with the Jews,
state anti-Semitism, and popular orientalist rhetoric have led to the stigmatization of “traditional
Jews” unless they completely assimilated to the values of their host country. Jews were once
considered inherently barbaric, regressive, corrupt, and violent which legitimized anti-Semitic
violence on their communities, and discriminatory state policies barring them from receiving
uplifting opportunities. “The Jewish Question” stumbled the French as they were reordering their
society along the lines of French universalism. Assimilating European Jews through dominant
Christian norms became the marker of ‘moderate’ Judaism. As once, constructing ‘moderate’
Judaism to satisfy European political interests existed, a similar case can now be seen
implemented towards Muslims living in the West. Today, the Middle East piques Western
political interests—filled with natural resources, political strongholds, and consumers of
American weaponry. What better ally to have, than the ‘moderate’ Muslim?
Notions of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslim have more to do with mere proclivities for
violence. Many times, peacefully integrated and practicing Muslims are conflated with
extremists because of embedded orientalist images that exist in Western society. But why do
‘moderate’ Muslims who fit Western standards of moderation, absorb orientalist tropes regarding
their own traditions? Do they accept their position in the pecking order? Being a part of the
accepted definition of ‘moderate’, undoubtedly, places one higher up in a social hierarchy of
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power. ‘Moderate’ Muslims attain political and social clout among more influential individuals
at the expense of selling out the ‘traditional’ Islam of members within their own communities. In
a nation that boasts of equality and human rights for all, are we truly equal? Are Muslims
considered equal if they do not compromise on their identity and politics for the sake of Western
political interests?
It is my hope that this small blueprint allows for us to question our notions of right and
wrong, of good and bad, of moderation and extremism. If we are not to repeat the same mistakes
found in history, in which the systematic marginalization of vulnerable groups has contributed to
massive global conflicts (i.e. the Holocaust), then let us begin with our analysis of language,
propaganda, and state interests. One component that I pay little attention to in my thesis is how
the discourse surrounding ‘moderation’ changes under the newly elected Trump administration.
As we enter a new phase in world politics with a general shift towards Western right-wingleaning leaders, we need to rethink the policies affecting Muslims, and the reconstruction of their
political identities.

90

Bibliography
Books
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism. New York: Verso, 1991.
Auda, Jasser. Maqasid al-Shariah: A Beginner’s Guide. International Institute of Islamic
Thought (IIIT), 2008.
Bayoumi, Moustafa. This Muslim American Life: Dispatches from the War on Terror. New York
University Press, 2015.
Brown, Jonathan. Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the
Prophet’s Legacy. Oneworld Publications, 2015.
Commins, David. “Chapter 3: Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud and the Taming of Wahhabi Zeal” in The
Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris, 2009.
Corbett, Rosemary R. Making Moderate Islam: Sufism, Service, and the "Ground Zero Mosque"
Controversy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016.
Dumitru, Diana. The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Borderlands
of Romania and the Soviet Union. Cambridge University Press, 2016
Ewing, Katherine Pratt. Being and Belonging: Muslims in the United States since 9/11. New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008.
El-Fadl, Khaled A. The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from Extremists. New York: Harper San
Francisco, 2005.
Ernst, Carl. The Shambhala Guide to Sufism. Boston: Shambhala Pub, 1997.
Grewal, Zareena. Islam is a Foreign Country. New York: New York University Press, 2014.
Haddad, Y. Yvonne. Becoming American: The Forging of Arab and Muslim Identity in Pluralist
America. Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2011.
Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the
Mass Media. New York: Pantheon, 1988.
Hodgson, G.S. Marshall. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization.
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974.
Khan, Muqtedar. Debating Moderate Islam: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West. The
University of Utah Press, 2007.
Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. New York: Random House
Trade Paperbacks, 2004.
Lewis, Bernard. What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

91

Mahmood, Saba. Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report. Princeton University
Press, 2015.
Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of
Terror. New York: Three Leaves Press, 2004.
Menocal, Maria Rosa. The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created
a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain. New York: Back Bay Books, 2012.
Musallam, B.F. Sex and Society in Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Ramadan, Tariq. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press,
2005.
Said, Edwards. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
Samuels, Maurice. The Right to Difference: French Universalism and the Jews. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2016.
Schainker, Ellie. Confessions of the Shtetl: Jewish Converts from Judaism in Imperial Russia,
1817-1906. Stanford University Press, 2016.
Scott, Joan W. Politics of the Veil. Princeton University Press, 2010.

Journal Articles
Carle, Robert. “Tariq Ramadan and the Quest for a Moderate Islam.” Society Vol 48, No. 1.
(2010): 58-69. Accessed April 10, 2017.
Casanova, Jose. “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective.” Hedgehog
Review 8 (2006): 7-22. Accessed December 23, 2016.
Giunchi, Elisa. “The Reinvention of ‘Sharī’a’ Under the British Raj: In Search of Authenticity
and Certainty. The Journal of Asian Studies 69, no. 4 (2010): 1119-1142. Accessed January 5,
2017.
Haddad, Y. Yvonne., and T. Golson. "Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction, and
Cooption of "Moderate Islam" in Western Europe." Journal of Church and State 49, no. 3 (2007):
487-515. Accessed December 17, 2016.
Heffner, Robert W. “Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing
Age.” Annual Review of Anthropology 27, no. 1 (1998): 83-104. Accessed December 5, 2016.
Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49.
Accessed December 17, 2016.
Khan, Muqtedar M.A. “Nice but Tough: A Framework for US Foreign Policy in the Muslim
World.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol IX, no. 1. (2002): 355-362. Accessed April 10,
2017.
Mahmood, Saba. "Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation."
Public Culture 18, no. 2 (2006): 323-47. Accessed August 20, 2016.
92

Mitchell, Timothy. “McJihad: Islam in the U.S Global Order.” Duke University Press 73, Vol.
20, No. 4. (2002). Accessed February 23, 2017.

Reports and Surveys
Benard, Cheryl. “Civil and Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, Strategies.” Pittsburgh:
RAND Corporation, 2003.
“Concerns with the New York Police Department's Report: ‘Radicalization in the West.’”
Brennan Center for Justice. September 8, 2009. Accessed April 15, 2017.
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/concerns-new-york-police-departments-reportradicalization-west
Rabasa, Angela. “Building Moderate Muslim Networks.” RAND Corporation, 2007. Accessed
April 1, 2017. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9251/index1.html
Khandaker, Lamiya. “The Moderate American Muslim,” SurveyMonkey. August 12, 2016.
Lipka, Michael. “U.S Religious Groups and their Political Leanings.” The Pew Research Center,
2016. Accessed February 15, 2017. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/23/u-sreligious-groups-and-their-political-leanings/
“Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and Around the World.” Report. The Pew Forum
on Religion and Public Life. Pew Research Center, 2016.
“Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.” NYPD Report. August 31, 2007.
Accessed April 15, 2017.
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/20070816.NYPD.Radicalization.
in.the.West.pdf
Shuster, Mike. “The Middle East and the West: WWI and Beyond.” NPR. August 20, 2004.
Accessed April 14, 2017. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=3860950
“The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other.” The Pew Research Center.
June 22, 2006. Accessed April 31, 2017. http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/253.pdf
“The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society.” Report. The Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life. Pew Research Center, 2013.
Telhami, Shibly. “American Attitudes towards Islam and Muslims.” Center for Middle East
Policy at Brookings, 2016.

Websites
“About AIFD.” American Islamic Forum for Democracy. January 12, 2017. Accessed March 22,
2017. https://aifdemocracy.org/.
“About RAND: History.” Rand Corporation. Accessed April 1, 2017.
https://www.rand.org/about/history.html
93

Afary, Janet. “Iranian Revolution of 1978-79.” Encyclopaedia Britannica. May 31, 2013.
Accessed April 15, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution-of-1978-1979
Beckwith, Ryan Teague. "Read Clinton's Speech Criticizing Trump's Muslim Ban." Time. June
14, 2016. Accessed February 12, 2017. http://time.com/4368907/hillary-clinton-muslim-bandonald-trump-orlando-shooting/.
Beydoun, Khaled. “The Myth of the ‘Moderate’ Muslim.” Al Jazeera. May 20, 2016. Accessed
April 2, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/05/myth-moderate-muslim160511085819521.html
Bilefsky, Dan. “Ban on Headscarves at Work is Legal, EU Court Rules.” New York Times.
March 14, 2017. Accessed April 19, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/world/europe/headscarves-ban-european-court.html?_r=1
Brown, Jonathan. “Moderate Islam” & Muslim American Leadership: Reflections before the
Deluge.” Al-Madina Institute. Jan 13, 2017. Accessed April 1, 2017.
http://almadinainstitute.org/blog/moderate-islam-and-muslim-american-leadership-reflectionsbefore-the-deluge/
Bush, George W. "Remarks at the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service." The
American Presidency Project. September 14, 2001. Accessed February 12, 2017.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18874.
Chappell, Bill. "World's Muslim Population Will Surpass Christians This Century, Pew Says."
NPR. April 2, 2015. Accessed January 29, 2017. http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2015/04/02/397042004/muslim-population-will-surpass-christians-this-century-pew-says.
Ciabattari, Jane. “Why is Rumi the Best-Selling Poet in the United States?” BBC. April 21,
2014. Accessed April 8, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20140414-americas-bestselling-poet
“Fear, Inc. The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America.” Center for American Progress.
2015. Accessed April 22, 2017. https://islamophobianetwork.com/about
"Full Executive Order Text: Trump’s Action Limiting Refugees into the U.S." New York Times.
January 27, 2017. Accessed February 6, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/refugee-muslim-executive-ordertrump.html?_r=0.
Glionna, John. “U.S Muslim Leaders Say FBI Pressuring People to Become Informants.” LA
Times. Nov 3, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2017. http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-muslimsfbi-20141103-story.html
Haddad, Yvonne Y. “The Quest for ‘Moderate’ Islam. Lecture at Graduate School of Islamic and
Social Sciences. February 18, 2004.
http://www.alhewar.org/yvonne_haddad_quest_for_moderate_islam.htm
Hale, Virginia. “Survey Reveals Aggressive Pro-Shari’a Attitudes in Countries Providing Major
Source of EU Immigrants.” Breitbart, May 10 2016. Accessed February 05, 2017.
http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/05/10/survey-reveals-aggressive-pro-sharia-attitudes-incountries-providing-major-source-of-eu-migrants/.
94

"Hanafi School of Law." Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Accessed March 08, 2017.
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e798.
Hassan, Ahmed. "Democracy, Religion and Moral Values: A Road Map toward Political
Transformation in Egypt." Foreign Policy Journal. September 05, 2016. Accessed February 12,
2017. http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/07/02/democracy-religion-and-moral-values-aroad-map-toward-political-transformation-in-egypt/.
Manzoor, Sarfraz. “Can We Drop the Term ‘Moderate Muslim?’ It’s Meaningless.” The
Guardian. March 16, 2015. Accessed March 22, 2017
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/16/moderate-muslim-devout-liberalreligion
McKenzie, Sheena. “French Mayors Maintain Burkini Bans Despite Court Ruling.” CNN.
August 29, 2016. Accessed April 19, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/29/europe/frenchmayors-refuse-lift-burkini-ban/
Muir, Hugh. "Secret Whitehall Plan to Win Over Muslim Youth." The Guardian, May 30, 2004.
Accessed December 17, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/may/31/uk.religion
"Muslim Opinion Polls." The Religion of Peace. Accessed February 05, 2017.
http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/pages/articles/opinion-polls.aspx.
Nusairat, Tuqa. “Bill Clinton’s Loyalty Test for Muslim Americans.” Foreign Policy. July 28,
2016. Accessed March 20, 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/28/bill-clintons-loyalty-testfor-muslim-americans-trump-islam/
Ramadan, Tariq. “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim.” New Statesman, July 28, 2010. Accessed April
10, 2017. http://www.newstatesman.com/religion/2010/02/muslim-religious-moderation
“RAND Proposes Blueprint for Building Moderate Muslim Networks.” RAND. 2007. Accessed
April 23, 2017. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9251/index1.html
Shaykh Abdullah bin Bayyah. “Transcript for Muslims Living in Non-Muslim Lands.” Shaykh
Hamza. July 31, 1999. Accessed April 3, 2017. http://shaykhhamza.com/transcript/MuslimsLiving-in-Non-Muslim-LandsSpencer, Robert. “How Feisal Abdul Rauf and Muqtedar Khan Whitewash Sharia.” Jihad Watch.
November 1, 2010. Accessed April 10, 2017. https://www.jihadwatch.org/2010/11/how-feisalabdul-rauf-and-muqtedar-khan-whitewash-sharia
Wilkie, Christina and Elise Foley. “Donald Trump Proposes Ideological Test For Entry To The
United States.” Huffington Post. Aug 16, 2016. Accessed March 22, 2017.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-immigrationtest_us_57b224c9e4b007c36e4fc81e
Younus, Shereen. “I Am Not a Moderate Muslim.” The Harvard Crimson. Feb 10, 2017.
Accessed March 22, 2017. http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/2/10/younus-i-am-not-amoderate-muslim/

95

Videos
“Ayaan Hirsi Ali: Islam Needs Reform.” Youtube video, 8:06. Posted March 30, 2008. Accessed
March 27, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3BBLt6bLMA
“Bill Maher: Overtime ‘Where are the Moderate Muslims?” Youtube video, 2:11. Posted May
18, 2015. Accessed March 27, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vh05M-RCU2Q
“Real Time with Bill Maher: Islam and Free Speech (HBO).” Youtube video, 6:35. Posted Oct
31, 2014. Accessed March 27, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zRlm4o6he74
“Bill Maher: Liberals Not Helping ‘Reform Islam’ with Guest Speaker Asra Nomani.” Youtube
video, 6:35. Posted Feb 25, 2017. Accessed March 27, 2017.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vWQfvyp5w6k
“UpFront: Muslim Americans and US Liberal Values.” Al Jazeera English. Youtube video,
17:13. Posted Dec 15, 2015. Accessed April 2, 2017.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kP3uL6NQLRY

96

